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Summary
The aim of the thesis is to advance our understanding of the policymakers’ and 
public’s behaviour and their interactions. What emerges from the analysis is how the 
government chooses the optimal policy and how the public forms its expectations. 
Part I focuses on the time-consistency issues which arise in a managed exchange rate 
regime, when a country pursues exchange rate stabilization but wants to retain some 
monetary independence. Part II explores the strategic interactions between the 
government and the private sector in an environment with uncertainty and asymmetric 
information, in a closed economy model of monetary policy a' la Barro-Gordon. Part 
III is concerned with the same issues in an open economy model, after a change in the 
exchange rate regime. The techniques used involve the Bellman principle of optimality 
and the Kalman-Bucy filter.
The analysis o f Chapter 1 points out that discrepancies between the time- 
consistent policy and the optimal (time-inconsistent) linear rule can emerge both in the 
long run equilibrium and in the path to the steady state. Chapter 2 examines how the 
government can take advantage of asymmetric information to achieve an initially low 
time-consistent inflation, although, in the long run, inflation must converge to the 
higher complete information equilibrium. The analysis of Chapter 3 shows how, even 
when the government does not attempt to manipulate the public’s learning, inflation 
is still lower than in the steady state, immediately after the adoption of an exchange 
rate peg, in an open economy. This low inflation may not be costless, however, as it 
can be accompanied by high output losses if inflationary expectations start from a high 
level. Finally, Chapter 4 shows how the way in which the information asymmetry is 
introduced matters for the determination of government policy.

1The aim of the thesis is to advance our understanding of the behaviour of, and 
interactions between, policymakers and the public. The government’s actions result 
from its objectives and the constraints it faces, hence policy decisions are endogenous. 
Similarly, private operators are considered to be rational and forward-looking. Thus, 
the strategic interaction between the policy authorities and the public constitutes the 
core of the thesis. What emerges from the analysis is how the government chooses 
the optimal policy and how the public forms its expectations. Although the entire 
thesis deals with optimal policy decisions, Part I studies the govemment/public 
interaction in the context of exchange rate management, and focuses on the 
comparison between the time-consistent and time-inconsistent strategies, while Parts 
II and III explore the policymakers’ and private sector’s behaviour in an environment 
with uncertainty and incomplete information. In such a realistic and complex 
framework. Part II attempts to explain actual and expected inflation in a closed 
economy, while Part III attempts to do this in an open economy after a change in the 
exchange rate regime.
Part I analyses optimal exchange rate management. In particular, it examines 
the government’s optimal policy when a country aims at stabilizing the exchange rate, 
but wants to retain some degree of monetary independence. The attention is focused 
on the time-consistency issues that arise in this framework and the purpose of Chapter 
1 is to build a bridge between the time-consistency literature and optimal exchange 
rate management studies, which seem to have neglected this important issue. Chapter 
1 stems from the observation that countries participating in quasi-fixed exchange rate 
arrangements want to retain some monetary independence and sometimes have 
conflicting objectives. Therefore, the questions to be addressed here are: what is the
optimal government policy? And how does the optimal time-inconsistent strategy 
compare with the incentive-compatible one? The analysis is carried out using a 
deterministic continuous-time model.
Part II builds on the well known Barro-Gordon monetary policy model in order 
to examine how the presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information impinges on 
the policy formation process. Uncertainty is a crucial element of reality and it is 
introduced in the form of the government’s imperfect command of inflation. The 
introduction of information asymmetry renders the study of the strategic interactions 
between the policymakers and the public more interesting and complex, because the 
scope for manipulating the less-informed player’s expectations is enhanced. 
Asymmetric information enters the model as lack of information on the part of the 
private sector about the government’s preferences. The private sector’s behaviour is 
not assumed to be gullible and naive, and their learning process reflects this. The 
government’s optimal policy is also the optimal signalling strategy, since the 
policymakers take into account the information content of their actions. The analysis 
is carried out using a continuous-time stochastic model and the techniques used 
involve the Bellman principle of optimality and the Kalman-Bucy filter.
Part III, which comprises Chapters 3 and 4, is concerned with an open 
economy model in which asymmetric information is present.
Chapter 3 analyses the government's optimal policy, with respect to the choice 
of planned inflation, when a country changes exchange rate regime. The regime 
switch examined is that from free floating, where purchasing power parity always 
holds, to a pegged regime. This is a situation in which information asymmetries are 
particularly relevant, since the public has never before been able to observe the
2
3policymakers’ preferences about competitiveness. After the regime shift, the 
government can affect the real exchange rate, and hence the public can gather 
information about the government’s preferences from its actions. Such a change in 
the exchange rate regime is often advocated as a way of implementing a disinflation. 
However, some have argued that, in the presence of information asymmetries, and 
hence when the public has to learn about the characteristics of the new environment, 
the effectiveness of this anti-inflationary device could he impaired. This chapter 
challenges this view and aims at analysing the optimal policy and the public’s 
evolution of inflationary expectations in such a scenario, taking fully into account the 
strategic interactions between the two players. The model used is stochastic and the 
techniques employed are the same as in Part II.
Chapter 4 explores the role of the information structure using the model 
developed in Chapter 3. Its purpose is to examine whether simple changes in the 
information structure can alter the solution to the government’s optimization and, if 
so, to highlight the differences.


41.1 Survey of the literature and introduction
Much has been written about the merits of different exchange rates regimes and on 
their management. During the seventies and early eighties, a large stream of studies 
dealt with optimal exchange rate intervention in the context of simple IS-LM 
stochastic discrete time models, where the government aims at minimizing output 
fluctuations. The general message of these studies is that, in the presence of various 
shocks, neither a fixed nor a flexible exchange regime is optimal; the optimal system 
is a compromise between the two, apart from very special cases. Furthermore, when 
financial disturbances are likely to be more frequent and larger than real shocks, it is 
desirable to have a higher degree of exchange rate fixity. On the other hand, if the 
real sector is more unstable, it is preferable to allow more flexibility. As Kaminow 
(1979) points out, this approach is a restatement of the Mundell-Fleming results 
concerning the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy with fixed and floating 
exchange rates. The difference lies in the fact that the studies on intervention take 
into consideration a continuum of regimes and adopt an optimizing approach. This 
voluminous literature reflects the emphasis on output and employment stabilization 
typical of the seventies.
Later the emphasis shifted towards the control of inflation, and as a result, 
exchange rate policies were directed at achieving price stability and monetary 
discipline. With this purpose in mind, a fixed exchange rate system, whereby a 
country seeking price stability links its currency to that of a country with a better 
monetary record, appeared to be an answer (for an extended survey on this topic see 
Chapter 3).
Another reason for advocating exchange rate stabilization is based on the 
widespread belief that exchange rate markets constitute a case of market failure
5(Krugman 1989). The same normative indication is also supported by those who do 
not subscribe to the view of market inefficiencies, arguing that exchange rate 
instability stems from governments’ policies (McKinnon 1988). Therefore, by the late 
eighties, aided by the very large fluctuations between the major currencies that 
occurred in that decade, consensus appeared to gather around exchange rate 
stabilization.
The preferred form of exchange rate stabilization was target zones rather than 
a fixed exchange rate system; this was in line with the theoretical results on optimal 
exchange rate management. Target zones do not require as much intervention as fixed 
exchange rate systems, and they leave some leeway for real shocks, as well as for 
limited demand management or some degree of monetary independence. In the 
context of a Dornbusch-type model, Laskar (1986) offers some rationale for this kind 
of exchange rate arrangement when countries aim at reducing fluctuations in output 
and prices. Frenkel and Golstein (1986) offer a guide to a target zone regime, 
providing a non-technical analysis of the reasons for having target zones and of their 
implementation. In addition, it was believed that target zones could alleviate the 
problem of speculation. The latter has been the concern of a large body of literature 
which dealt with the pegging of the exchange rate as a stabilization scheme for the 
price of a commodity (Henderson and Salant 1978; Salant 1983; Rood and Garber 
1983, 1984; Krugman 1979; el at.). The main points made are: a) stabilization 
devices by means of buffer stocks are bound to fail. The failure finally occurs via a 
speculative attack, b) Speculative attacks are not the result of arbitrary psychological 
factors, but the outcome of optimizing behaviour. In such a system, the monetary 
authority has no degree of freedom in deciding how to intervene, since speculators
6will initially sell all their holdings to the government, and thereafter the government 
will have to sell the commodity, or foreign reserves, according to the demand induced 
by the fixed price. Essentially, the issue emerging from this literature is the non­
sustainability of a stabilization scheme when fundamentals are against it.
Recently, following the seminal work by Krugman (1991), a new stream of 
studies on target zones has appeared (Miller and Weller 1991; Bertola and Caballero 
1992; Svensson 1991; Flood and Garber 1992; Delgado and Dumas 1992; el al.\ see 
Bertola 1991 for a technical survey). It tackles the question of the working of target 
zones, and in particular looks at the behaviour of the exchange rate inside the band, 
in the context of continuous-time stochastic models.
The literature on target zones has gone through two phases. During the first 
phase, target zones were portrayed as stabilization devices which displayed a 
stabilizing effect, even when intervention was not carried out. This is the so called 
"honeymoon effect" which means that, in response to a variation in fundamentals 
assumed to follow a Brownian motion process, the variation in the exchange rate is 
smaller with a target zone than with a free floating regime. (This gives rise to the 
famous S-shaped curve.)
In the second phase, the viability issue was addressed. The credibility and 
sustainability question gained momentum and a connection between price stabilization 
schemes and speculative attacks models was established (Krugman and Rotemberg 
1992; e t a i ) .
The determination of the exchange rate path also requires the specification of 
the intervention policy; because of the forward-looking nature of the exchange rate, 
it is necessary to specify the government’s behaviour in order to determine exchange
7rate expectations. In Krugman (1991), intervention is marginal and infinitesimal; it 
takes place only when the exchange rate reaches the edges of the band and it is 
carried out just to prevent the exchange rate from crossing the boundaries. Miller and 
Weller (1991) also have infinitesimal marginal intervention, whilst, in their previous 
work, (Miller and Weller 1989) there is marginal intervention, but it is discrete so as 
to wipe out the interest rate differential. Also Svensson (1991) and Froot and Obstfeld 
(1992) deal with marginal intervention, while Flood and Garber (1992) have 
considered discrete infra-marginal intervention. Krugman (1991) and Miller and 
Weller (1991) do not offer any justification for the intervention rule considered, other 
than that it is exogenously given. In Flood and Garber’s model, there is an infinite 
number of intervention rules that can sustain a certain target zone. Svensson (1991) 
and Froot and Obstfeld (1992) emphasize that the specification of a band for 
fundamentals, besides a band for the exchange rate, is necessary in order to get a 
unique equilibrium for the exchange rate. In all these studies, no suggestion is offered 
about how to choose the intervention rule. These models do not shed much light on 
the optimal policy to be implemented in order to sustain the target zone.
Dixit (1989) presents the optimal strategy for the control of a Brownian motion 
process, for a general reward function. He considers two types of costs of regulation; 
lump-sum costs and linear costs. Assuming the existence of a band and adopting a 
discrete time approximation, Dixit obtains the conditions for an optimum. Impulse 
control, i.e. marginal and discrete, turns nut to be optimal when there are lump-sum 
costs. When there are only linear costs, instantaneous or harrier control, i.e. marginal 
and infinitesimal, is the outcome of the optimization. These results are fairly intuitive. 
If the costs of regulation have a fixed component, then it is better to push the process
8well inside the band, so that the controller will not incur these costs too often. An 
application of Dixit’s results to the problem of exchange rate management has been 
carried out by Avesani (1990). Using Krugman’s (1991) model, Avesani obtains 
results which mirror Dixit’s: given that the cost function does not include any fixed 
component, marginal and infinitesimal intervention turns out to be the optimal 
strategy. Although Avesani’s work is a first attempt at adopting an optimizing 
approach in the analysis of intervention in a target zone, several problems are not 
addressed, most importantly, that of time-consistency.
In the analysis of optimal exchange rate management, whilst the credibility of 
the band has been considered and mainly linked to the sustainability issue, the 
credibility of the optimal policy has not been a matter for concern. An exception in 
this respect is the work by Svensson (1992), which examines a managed exchange rate 
system without bands. However, Svensson’s analysis concentrates on the optimal 
response to different types of shocks, while the differences between the solution under 
discretion and the solution under commitment are obscured.
On one hand, the time-consistency issues have found wide application to 
monetary policy games in a closed economy (these are surveyed in Chapter 2). On 
the other hand, it is very surprising to find that the studies on optimal exchange rate 
management have neglected the time-consistency issues which inevitably arise when 
agents with forward-looking behaviour are present. Some work that has been carried 
nut along these lines, has been concerned with stabilization policy in open economies 
(Driffill 1982; Miller 1985; Miller and Salmon 1985; el at.) but not with exchange rate 
management.
After having surveyed the literature, the need for further research on optimal
9intervention rules appears clear and, in particular, the need to address the time- 
consistency issues in this framework. This chapter attempts to close this gap existing 
in the literature by setting up a model of exchange rate management. The analysis of 
time-consistency issues which arise in this context constitutes the core of the chapter. 
As these issues are more prominent in a Svensson-type framework, the analysis deals 
with a managed exchange rate regime without bands. In particular, the optimal policy 
is derived, when a country pursues exchange rate stabilization but wants to retain 
some degree of monetary independence. The purpose is to examine whether the 
optimal policy is incentive-compatible and, if not, how it compares to the time- 
consistent solution. Is there a difference between the two policies in the long run, or 
do they differ only in the convergence path towards the same long run equilibrium? 
This analysis attempts to build a bridge between the time-consistency literature, which 
is surveyed in Chapter 2, and exchange rate management studies.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, the model is 
specified, in Section 1.3 the time-consistent policy is presented, while the optimal 
linear rule is the subject of Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, the optimal linear, but time- 
inconsistent policy is compared and contrasted to the incentive-compatible policy. 
Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The model
The problem is formulated in a simple way. The government aims at minimizing a 
quadratic function, equation (1). In particular, policymakers want to minimize the 
discounted (discount factor p) square deviations of the exchange rate, s ,, from a Fixed 
chosen level, s, and the deviations of the money stock, m, , from the desired value.
10
m.
The exchange rate is determined by a standard monetary model, as shown in 
equation (2), where v, is velocity and E(ds, /dt) is the expected variation of the 
exchange rate; expectations are assumed to be rational. Policymakers can affect the 
exchange rate by varying the money supply: there is a contemporaneous effect of 
money on the exchange rate and also an effect operating via expectations on the 
current and future exchange rate. The policy instrument is the rate of variation of the 
money supply, y , , equation (3), while m, is the state variable.
The choice of 5"is made by the policy authorities independently of the choice 
of m. Therefore, it is possible to have conflicting exchange rate and money 
objectives. Two such cases can arise: the first is when policymakers want an 
appreciated exchange rate (low s) and loose money supply (high rrl). The second is 
when high S is coupled with low m. The former case can happen if an appreciated 
exchange rate level is desirable in order to achieve low inflation, but loose money is 
desirable in order to boost the level of economic activity. It is also conceivable that 
the exchange rate target is chosen as part of an exchange rate agreement and cannot 
be modified unilaterally by one country, as it is the case in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). This would imply that 
even if the exchange rate target was initially determined in line with the money target, 
subsequent changes in the money target, due for example to changes in internal 
economic conditions, but not in the exchange rate parity, would lead to conflicting 
objectives. It is possible to think of the UK before abandoning the ERM as being an 
example of the first case of conflicting objectives, and Germany after unification as 
being an example of the second case of conflicting objectives.
11
On intuitive grounds, it is easy to conjecture that when the two objectives are 
in conflict with one another, the policymakers might attempt to manipulate private 
agents’ expectations, and in this way, given the forward-looking nature of the 
exchange rate, manipulate the exchange rate itself. For example, if the targets are low 
s and high ffi, the monetary authority could initially reduce the money supply, hence 
inducing expectations of exchange rate appreciation, and then increase the money 
supply in order to get closer to the money stock target, whilst the exchange rate will 
be kept appreciated by the public’s expectations. This suggests that the government 
could have an incentive to deviate from a chosen policy. In other words, the lack of 
policy instruments, compared to the number of objectives, can make the ex-ante 
optimal policy time-inconsistent (see Persson and Tabellini 1990).
The objective function also comprises a squared term in y, which represents 
the costs of intervention. These costs could result from various sources; they could 
be material costs of intervention or arise from the authorities’ reluctance to intervene. 
A squared term in y, would also appear in the objective function, if the government 
aimed at minimizing variations of the domestic interest rate, in either direction. In 
fact, from the monetary model, assuming v, equals zero, the interest rate is
», -  -  y
hence, taking into account equation (5), the expected rate of variation of the exchange 
rate can be expressed as follows;
1 It is assumed that the foreign interest rale equals zero, for simplicity.
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E(di/dt) = = y - '(s ,- l)y ,.
Therefore, when the government dislikes variations in domestic interest rates, the right 
hand side of the above equation would enter the objective function squared, i.e. this 
would yield a square term in y, . The latter is the preferred justification here for the 
presence of intervention costs in the objective function. Since a target zone or some 
other form of exchange rate stabilization device introduces higher volatility in interest 
rates, it is reasonable to assume that the government will want to take into account 
both, exchange rate and interest rate variability and thus work out the best compromise 
between the two.
Thus the government’s problem is as follows:
where
+ (n^-m)2 +
s, -  tn, + v, ♦ y E(ds/dl)
( 1)
(2)
s.t. (3)
The problem is solved with the help of the undetermined coefficient method. The 
conjectural function for the exchange rate is the following:
(4)
where s„ , s, and 8j are the time-invariant coefficients which have to be determined.
13
Without loss of generality, it is assumed, for simplicity, that v, equals zero and thus 
exchange rate expectations can be expressed as:
The model is deterministic, although introducing a stochastic element by making 
velocity a Brownian motion would not alter the solution substantially.
The results can be summarized in the two propositions which follow. 
Proposition 1
The time-consistent policy of the government, y,* , for the problem set up above is:
Eids, /dt) ■ s^dm , /dt). (5)
y," - D m, - [m ♦ (1+ys,D)s)(2+ys,D)
where D is
(7)
and s, is the solution to the following polynomial
♦ -i[c(l-PY)-4Y2KJ ♦ (PIT -2)», + 1 - 0 .
In Section 1.3, proposition 1 is proved. Although it is possible to rule out solutions 
to the above polynomial which are not in (he range (0,1) on economic grounds, it is
still possible that multiple solutions arise 2.
Proposition 2
The optimal linear rule, which results in being time-inconsistent, is:
14
y. (9)
where A is the solution to the following polynomial:
(1
(">o-L)2 
(P -2 A)2
-,(Âyip-Â)= Hs'B) * T (S ’-? ) ] *
2y(P-2A) + cA(p. A) + 2 + 2
( 10)
(1-yA)5 ( 1—Y A)2
There is a unique solution in this case. In Section 1.4, proposition 2 is proved.
13 The time-consistent policy
In this section, the government’s problem presented above is solved using the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and hence dynamic programming ensures 
that the solution found is time-consistent. The starting point is the conjecture about 
government policy. It is assumed that the rate of change of money is adjusted by 
policymakers according to a rule which is a linear function of the state, i.e. of the 
money stock. The conjectural function for the policy is as follows:
Lockwood (1991) shows how multiple equilibria may be common in linear quadratic dynamic 
games with two players.
15
y, -  F + Dm,, (11)
where F and D are undetermined coefficients which are time-invariant.
The second conjecture to be made concerns the value function, V ,. The value 
function is assumed to be:
V, (ra,) -  e^ ' W, (m.) (12)
where
W, -  Ho. ♦ Hi, rai * Ha "t* . 0 3)
The HJB equation for this problem can be written as:
Pw , -  H„ -  K  »>, - Ha m,2 “
(14)
mini [m.+Ys.iF+Dm.j-s]2 ♦ (m.-ni)2 ♦ £y,2 ♦ Wm y) ,
y, 2
where Wm is the first derivative of the function W with respect to the state variable. 
The first order condition obtained by differentiation of the HJB equation is:
. _ _ (H„ ♦ 2pa m,) (15)
c
In equation (15), the optimal control, y*, , is a function of the undetermined 
coefficients of the value function. These are determined by replacing y, with equation 
(15) into the HJB equation and then equating coefficients. The equations resulting 
from equating the coefficients of the terms in m2, and m ,, are, respectively:
16
2 ^
P2, -  -P »  ♦ P 1*2. - -  O ns.D )’, (16)
P„ = PP» ♦ -P u  1*2. * 2™ ~ 2(1+ys,DXys,F -s) . c
07)
The solutions to equations (16) and (17) are the time-invariant solutions and the 
solution for ^  is 3:
c -P ♦
N
P2-»—( 1 ♦(! ♦Ys.D)1) c
4
(18)
From the quadratic equation for \i2 , the positive solution, shown above, was chosen, 
whilst the negative solution was ruled out based on the second order conditions for 
a minimum. Given equation (18), the solution for p, is:
P.
2 (1 ♦Ys1D)(ys1F-s) -  2m
P + 1
T  T-J P2+—|1 +(1+Y*|D)2]c
(19)
Substitution of |i, and fij in the control equation (IS), yields an equation for the 
control of the form initially conjectured, so that the coefficients D and F can be 
determined. The equation for the control is:
' The time subscripts arc dropped since the solutions arc constant over time. This choice is 
consistent with the policy conjecture.
17
-4  (l+Ys1D)(ys|F-s)+4m
cp+c pJ+° [U (ln s ,D )2]
C
P 1 
2 _ 2n|
p 2+ _ [l+ (l+ y s  D)2] 
c
(20)
Combining equation (20) and equation (11) D is obtained as:
D (21)
and F as:
D |m ♦ (1+ys ,D)s)
(2*Y*,D)
(22)
The equation for the optimal policy is rewritten in a different way, for clarity.
y.*
|m ♦ (1+ys,D)s) 
(2+Y *|D)
(23)
where D is the negative coefficient shown in equation (21). The solution is complete 
once s, is determined. This is done by placing equation (23) into equation (3) and 
then (2) and combining the latter with the conjectural function for the exchange rate 
(equation 4). By so doing, a sixth order polynomial is obtained, viz:
18
(24)
Only the positive real roots are of interest here, since when money increases, it makes 
sense that the exchange rate depreciates (s, increases). Using Descartes’ rule of signs, 
it is possible to say that there can either be two or four real roots. The polynomial 
above can be factorized into a second order and a forth order polynomial. The forth 
order polynomial:
can have three or one positive real root, but there is always only one root between 
zero and one; this is the root chosen, whilst the others are ruled out on the basis that 
in a system under control the exchange rate should be stabilized (compared to the free 
float solution in which s, is unity). Furthermore, only if s, is comprised in the interval 
(0,1), D is negative; D is required to be negative in order to ensure convergence to the 
steady state. The solution from the second order polynomial is:
— Si* ♦ (— +PY-l)si! ♦ (2-py)s -  1 , c c 1
(25)
(26)
This solution is only acceptable when the parameter values produce an s, smaller than
one, for the reason mentioned above 4 . Furthermore, it has to be noted that in order 
to ensure that D is a real number the quantity inside the square root in equation (21) 
has to be positive. This imposes the following condition on s,:
19
si * E l l ♦ 2+_ ü4y N cp2
(27)
Since equation (26) satisfies the condition specified in equation (27), it is possible that 
there are two acceptable solutions for s, (i.e. between zero and one).
The time-consistent solution is now fully worked out and proposition 1 is 
proved. The resulting equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, so that this is the optimal 
time-consistent policy for the government, given the private sector’s strategy. The 
time-consistent policy is a linear rule, namely the rate of variation of money is a linear 
function of the money stock. Policymakers drive the money stock towards its long
run level, i.e. m ♦ (* ♦Yslp )s  ^exponentially. Finally, it is worth recalling that there
(2+ys,D)
is the possibility that two solutions are acceptable.
The limiting value of D when s, takes the value shown in equation (26) is finite and negative.4
20
1.4 The optimal linear rule
In this section, the optimal linear rule is derived. Although this may not he the 
optimal time-inconsistent policy over al!, here the search is restricted to linear rules 
because the rule announced should be simple. The solution procedure is as follows. 
First of all, the level of the money stock in the long run is calculated. In the steady 
state, y=0, thus it is possible simply to differentiate the objective function of the 
government with respect to m. This yields the following result:
The above equation shows that, in the long run, the money stock will be set at a level 
which is an average (with the same weights) of the exchange rate target and the 
money target; this long run level is denoted by L.
In order to derive the optimal speed at which the level of the money stock 
shown in equation (28) is approached, the integral of the government’s cost function 
is computed and then minimized. Before proceeding with the integration, it is 
necessary to specify the assumptions made in this calculation. The exchange rate is 
still conjectured to be a linear function of the money stock
s ♦ m -  L . (28)m * -
2
(29)
Furthermore, the procedure is aimed at deriving a linear rule, in which the steady state 
level of the money stock is given by equation (28). Hence, the following policy 
function is postulated:
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y, -  A(mt-L) (30)
where A is the undetermined policy coefficient which is obtained in what follows. 
The formula below is used in the derivation
i, -  . .1. . (31)
1 l -y A
Equation (31) is easily derived by combining equation (2), (5) and (30).
The government’s objective function can be integrated once the exchange rate 
has been replaced by equation (29). s '0 can be derived from equation (29) setting s, 
and m, equal to their long run value, namely L; thus, s~0 results in being
* ,- ( ! - * ,)  L .  (32)
s'0 is then substituted by equation (32) into the government’s objective function. 
Likewise, y, has to be replaced by equation (30) and finally m, is replaced by
m, ■ L ♦ (mo-L) c* (33)
which follows from equation (30). Having done all the necessary substitutions, the 
integrated cost function results in being;
v^ ( T T
(m0-L)2 
p-iA
A)
( l - i  
*) * (P-
( • ; .  i •  ! * • )
m0(*-m) ♦ i.(mJ- î ’)
(34)
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The first order condition is:
(1
k is -m )  ♦ i (m ’-F)1 ♦ 
~Y A)2(p - A)2 [ °' 2 ' ’\
(35)
(m0-L)2
(P -2 A)2
2Y(P-2A) + cA( A) + 2 + 2 1 -  0
(1-YA)j h (l-YA)’ J
If a simplified case is considered, in which the exchange rate and the money target 
coincide, and the discount rate equals 0, then the above formula reduces to
1 + 1 _ ca 2 -
(1-Y A): 1  (1-yA f
(36)
From the above equation, it is possible to obtain a polynomial in s', which is:
c -1 )*■ 2s, 0.
(37)
It is easy to show that this polynomial has a unique solution which lies between 0 and 
1 5. This is the solution chosen, for the reasons already pointed out in the previous 
section. As a result, there is a unique negative solution for A to equation (36). It can 
also be proven that this is the value of A which minimizes the government’s objective
function, by proving that the objective function is convex. In fact, letting A be the
unique negative value of A which satisfies equation (36), the second derivative of the
This can be shown by computing the value of the polynomial function at s,'*0, which is -1, 
and the value of the polynomial at s,'=l, which is 4y2 /c > 0, and then by proving that the first 
derivative of the polynomial with respect to s,' is always positive in the interval between 0 and I.
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objective function at a  equals:
d2V (m „-L )2 2y2
a A 2 A .A  2A 0 - y A)4
(38)
i.e. it is positive. Given that there is only one turning point for all negative values of 
A, and that the second derivative at that point is positive, the conclusion is that a
minimizes the government’s objective function 6. The optimal linear rule, which has 
L as the long run value for the money stock, is therefore obtained. This concludes the 
proof of proposition 2. The policy derived here entails that the money stock follows 
an autoregressive process. This policy is time-inconsistent, as it does not satisfy the 
HJB equation. Therefore, it does not constitute an equilibrium unless a commitment 
strategy is available. The next section discusses how the linear rule derived in this 
section compares to the time-consistent policy.
1.5 A comparison between the time-consistent policy and the time-inconsistent 
optimal linear rule
In Section 1.3 and 1.4, the time-consistent policy and the optimal linear time- 
inconsistent rule have been worked out. Although both policies are linear functions 
of the state, so that the monetary policy drives the money stock towards its long run 
level, the policies differ in the convergence path towards the steady state and, more
For A tending to 0 and to minus infinity, V lends to infinity.
importantly, in the steady state value of the money stock and hence also of the 
exchange rate.
The discrepancies in the long run solutions, which are reported below for 
convenience, are analysed:
m * -  L l H  (39)
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mTC
(1+y s,D)( ♦ m 
(2+ys.D)
(40)
where the subscript TJ means time-inconsistent and TC time-consistent.
First of all, it is interesting to note that when m -  s . when the exchange rate
target equals the money target, the long run value of the money stock is the same and 
it is equal to the target s. In this case, in fact, there is no conflict between the two 
objectives; hence the government has no incentive to deviate from the optimal policy 
and it can hit the target.
If m does not equal s, then the two equilibria are different. It is possible to 
see that equation (39) can be obtained from equation (40) setting D=(). This fact is 
used, and the knowledge that D is negative in equation (40), in order to carry out a 
comparison between the long run solutions with the time-consistent and time- 
inconsistent policies. This is done by computing the derivative of 1% ’ with respect 
to D which results in being:
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(41)
This means that when the desired level for money is higher than the exchange rate 
target, namely when the government pursues loose money and an appreciated 
exchange rate, the money stock resulting from the time-consistent policy is higher than 
that which would result with the optimal linear rule. The explanation for this is that 
the public knows the targets of the government and that, if the money stock were to 
be at the level obtained in steady state in the time-inconsistent case, given the public 
expectations of no variation in the exchange rate, there would be an incentive for the 
government to increase the money stock further. In this way, policymakers would get 
closer to the desired money level and obtain a depreciation of the exchange rate only 
due to the contemporaneous effect, but not through the expectations channel. Since 
the public knows this, it will anticipate this in its exchange rate expectations and force 
the government to increase the money supply more. The steady state level in the 
time-consistent case is such that the government has no incentive to increase money 
further, because the impact effect of a money increase on the exchange rate by itself 
offsets the advantage of approaching the money target.
On the other hand, when the exchange rate target is higher than the money 
target, the time-consistent policy will produce a lower level of the money stock than 
that which would result from the time-inconsistent linear rule. This is the specular 
case of that considered earlier on. If the policymakers pursue a tight monetary policy 
and a depreciated exchange rate, they would have an incentive to decrease the money 
stock if it were set at the steady state level resulting from the time-inconsistent policy,
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given the exchange rate expectations prevailing at that moment (i.e. of no variation 
in the exchange rate). This would allow the government to decrease money further 
in order to approach the money target, without undergoing the negative effects (in this 
case, this is seen as appreciation) of this policy on the exchange rate via the 
expectations channel. It follows that private agents anticipate this and will force 
policymakers to reduce money to such a level at which there would be no incentive 
to decrease money further, because the direct negative effects on the exchange rate of 
a reduction in the money stock deter any further decrease. The time-consistent 
solution therefore, shows a money stock which is lower than that prevailing with the 
optimal linear rule.
The confirmation that the time-consistent policy entails a larger loss comes 
from the evaluation of the value function in the steady state under the time- 
inconsistent and the time-consistent solution. The time-inconsistent solution yields the 
following value function:
y  _ (s * m)2 (42)
11 2p
whilst the time-consistent solution yields:
y  .  (» ♦ m)>
rc (2+ys,D)p
(43)
Because the loss under the time-consistent solution cannot be negative, it is bigger 
than that occurring with the time-inconsistent solution.
To compare the speeds of convergence towards the steady state, a simplified
27
case is initially adopted. Namely, it is assumed that the targets for the money stock 
and the exchange rate coincide. The discount rate is set equal to 0, for simplicity. 
Under these assumptions, the speed of convergence in the time-inconsistent case, A, 
is the solution to the polynomial shown in equation (36), which is rewritten below for 
convenience.
1
(l-yA):
2y A
(1-VA)' '
(44)
As regards the time-consistent case, only the forth order polynomial shown in equation 
(25) is considered, as this always provides a solution for s, in the (0,1) interval, whilst 
the solution for s, appearing in equation (26) is comprised in that interval only for 
certain parameter values. Equation (25) can be expressed in terms of D, i.e. the 
convergence speed in the time-consistent case, and, for p equal to 0, it results in the 
polynomial below
1 1
( i W
(45)
Equations (44) and (45) can now be compared. This is done by letting F(A) be
F(A) ♦ 1 -  I a j -  2? A(1-YA)J T  (1-YA)' ’ (46)
and evaluating F(A) at 5  • namely the speed in the time-consistent case, the function
F(A) is positive. This result, together with the fact that the first derivative of F(A)
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with respect to A is always positive for negative values of A 7, allows the conclusion 
that a<D . namely that the convergence is faster in the time-inconsistent case *.
The intuition for this result is that, when there is no discrepancy between the exchange 
rate and the money target, the government would get an additional bonus by 
announcing a rule which is faster than the time-consistent one, since this would 
stabilize exchange rate expectations and hence help the convergence towards the 
steady state, which is also the desired target for the exchange rate and the money 
stock. The case of no-conflict is illustrated in figure 1, which shows the stable 
manifolds under the time-consistent policy (the slope being s,) and under the optimal
linear rule (the slope being g ); in the figure, it is assumed that the exchange rate 
and the money target equal 0.
If the exchange rate and the money target differ, then the comparison between 
the speed of convergence to the steady state in the time-consistent and time- 
inconsistent case is no longer clear-cut, since the speed in the time-inconsistent case 
differs from the one discussed previously, i.e. when no conflict of objectives exists. 
If the equation defining the speed of convergence in the general time-inconsistent case 
is taken, and the discount rate is set equal to 0, for simplicity, the following formula 
attains
The limiting value of F(A) as A tends to minus infinity is minus infinity. 
" Both A and D arc negative values.
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-  — Y AV " S)+T (m2 ” ?  >1 +(1-Y A )1 2 | 2
(m0-L)2 
A 2
If A = A- i-e. if the speed of convergence were to be that prevailing in the time-
inconsistent case with no conflict of objectives, the second element in equation (47) 
would vanish. Hence, the speed when the exchange rate and money target differ is 
faster than when the targets coincide, and a fortiori faster than in the time-consistent 
case if:
-  2? A -  l A 2 ♦ 1 ♦ ___!___
( 1 - Y  A ) '  2  ( 1 - Y  A ) 2
(in -  s) ( s ♦ m ) > 0. (48)
Hence, if m > s and if •I’6 initial value of the money stock is greater than the steady 
state value in the time-inconsistent case, L, or if m < 5 and the initial money stock 
is smaller than L, then one can conclude that the speed of convergence in the general 
time-inconsistent case is faster than in the time-inconsistent case when exchange rate 
and money stock objectives coincide and hence also faster than in the time-consistent 
case. If the quantity in equation (48) is negative, the speed of convergence is slower 
than in the time-consistent case The intuition for this result is that, when the 
exchange rate target and the money target are not consistent and hence cannot be 
achieved, the government will choose to announce a fast or slow (time-inconsistent)
1 This can be proved by studying the form of the function of A appearing in equation (47) and
substituting A with D in that equation and noting that a negative quantity remains.
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rule depending on which allows to keep the system closer to the exchange rate and 
money targets. Figure 2 and 3 illustrate the two possible conflicts, namely s>m and s<m
respectively. The stable manifolds are drawn under the time-consistent policy (the 
slope being s,) and the optimal linear rule (the slope being §, )• The long run
equilibria are denoted by TC and TI respectively.
1.6 Concluding remarks
The conclusion is that when the government has conflicting money and exchange rate 
targets, there is scope for deviations from the optimal policy even in the long run10. 
Hence, in the absence of a commitment strategy, the optimal policy will not constitute 
a sustainable equilibrium. The incentive-compatible solution, i.e. the time-consistent 
one, becomes the only viable policy, but yields a higher value for the loss function. 
It is also worth noting that there could be two time-consistent equilibria.
The two policies differ in both the short and the long run. In the long run, it 
results that, when the money target is higher (lower) than the desired level for the 
exchange rate, the steady state value for the money stock is higher (lower) in the time- 
consistent case than under the optimal linear rule.
The speed of convergence to the steady state in the time-consistent differs to 
that in the time-inconsistent case even when the steady states coincide, namely when 
no conflict of objectives exists. In the latter case, the system converges faster under 
the time-inconsistent rule. If the exchange rate and money objectives differ, the speed
10 Here, the search for an optimal (time-inconsistent) policy has been limited to linear rules.
of convergence is not always faster in the time-inconsistent case.
This chapter can provide a rationale for the existence of target zones as 
institutional arrangements. They allow some flexibility when the government pursues 
more than one objective; more importantly, the institutional feature is crucial because 
it can offer the commitment necessary to enforce the optimal rule.
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2.1 Survey of the literature and introduction
A positive approach to the analysis of government policy requires the specification of 
the government’s objectives and the constraints it faces. Then it is possible to obtain 
the government’s policy endogenously as a result of constrained optimization. The 
rational expectations theory revolutioned this field. By assuming that economic agents 
use all the available information as best as they can to avoid systematic mistakes, the 
environment in which the government operates is radically altered. A major 
contribution to this field comes from the seminal paper 'Rules rather than discretion: 
the inconsistency o f optimal plans' by Kydland and Prescott (1977). There it is 
argued that in a world where agents form rational expectations, standard optimal 
control theory could not be used to solve policy planning problems. In fact, optimal 
control would lead to the selection of a time-inconsistent plan. By this they meant 
that the optimal policy selected at time t for a future date, is no longer optimal once 
the time of the implementation arrives, even though no new information has become 
available. On the other hand, a policy plan is said to be time-consistent if, once the 
plan has been chosen, there is no incentive to deviate from it when it is due to be 
implemented. It has been suggested (Persson 1988) that imposing time consistency 
amounts to adding another constraint to economic planning, and hence, in general, the 
time-consistent policy yields a lower payoff.
A broad thrust of research developed from one of the examples presented by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977): the inflation-unemployment example which was 
concerned with the conduct of monetary policy. From now onwards, the attention will 
focus exclusively on monetary policy games. The initial static model of the natural 
rate offered an explanation for the inflationary bias as the time-consistent outcome of
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a non-cooperative game between the policymakers and the private sector (Barro and 
Gordon 1983a). In this framework, the time consistency issue arises because of the 
presence of a distortion which renders the natural level of income lower than the 
desired level. The same type of problem could also emerge because of the presence 
of externalities or because of the lack of instruments compared to the number of 
objectives (Persson 1988; Persson and Tabellini 1990). What occurs is that the ex- 
ante optimal policy results in being a second best and the government’s attempts to 
achieve the first best (which can only be achieved by the removal of the distortion, 
or externality, or by the introduction of a sufficient number of instruments) leads the 
economy to a third best equilibrium, namely the time-consistent solution (Barro 
1986a). Therefore, the optimal plan is time-inconsistent and can only be a viable 
solution if some precommitment technology exists. However, given the sovereign 
nature of every national government, it is very difficult to impose binding 
commitments on them; hence, a reversion to the time-consistent, or discretionary, 
outcome can always take place. For this reason, it is always important to examine the 
time-consistent policy, while it is useful to derive the optimal rule in order to have a 
benchmark for comparison and/or formulate normative prescriptions.
The developments of this literature enrich the framework in which the model 
is cast, since it makes a specific effort to model the behaviour of the policymakers and 
the private sector. A first step in this direction is taken by making the model 
dynamic (Barro and Gordon 1983b). This highlights the fact that time-consistent 
equilibria, where the inflation rate is a weighted average of the discretionary outcome 
of a one-shot game and of the optimal zero inflation rule, could be sustained in a 
multiperiod model. This results from reputational forces which restrain the
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policymakers’ desire to create more inflation by means of a punishment mechanism. 
In this model, the problems are the multiplicity of the time-consistent equilibria and 
the need for an infinite horizon in order to obtain an inflationary bias lower than that 
present in the static game. However, both shortcomings of the Barro-Gordon model 
are partly overcome by subsequent studies.
The studies that followed tried to model more complex behaviour of the agents 
and shed more light on the strategic interactions between the players, namely between 
the government and the private sector. In this respect, the information structure is 
crucial in the determination of the government’s policy and of the public’s actions. 
In fact, the information structure affects the players’ understanding of the environment 
they are in, and their expectations about the other player’s actions. Strategic factors 
become particularly relevant when the information structure is asymmetric. In this 
case, the decisions of the more informed player —usually the government— will also 
take into account the optimal way of releasing, or concealing, information to the less 
informed opponent —the public. Thus, in an asymmetric information framework, it 
is very interesting to see how the policymakers manipulate the private sector’s 
expectations.
Backus and Driffill (1985a) and Barro (1986b) put forward a scenario where 
the public is uncertain about which of the two possible types of policymaker is in 
power, and the government’s horizon is finite. In this type of model, the more 
inflation-prone government mimics the behaviour of the anti-inflationary government, 
for a while. Whilst this occurs, the public updates its beliefs about the probability that 
the government is anti-inflationary, using Bayes’ rule. However, towards the end of 
the time in office the weak policymaker will inflate, producing a one-off boost in
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economic activity. After this, the discretionary outcome of the one-shot game attains. 
The equilibrium is unique and zero inflation can be sustained by reputational forces 
despite the finite horizon. This type of model can help explain the political business 
cycle and the surprises in inflation which lead to output fluctuations. On one hand, 
if the government in office is tough, then there will be only negative inflation 
surprises, on the other hand, if a weak policymaker is in power, after negative 
surprises, a period with a positive surprise will follow. The main drawbacks of this 
analysis are the presence of only two possible types of policymakers, the fact that the 
government only chooses between two rates of inflation and that the weak government 
randomizes between these two, from a certain point onwards. Also the initial value 
of the parameter which measures reputation is exogenously given.
In a similar setup, but where none of the two policymakers is committed to 
zero inflation, Vickers (1986) finds that the ’dry’ policymaker, namely the one more 
concerned about inflation, can decide to signal its preferences by producing very low 
inflation. However, multiple equilibria are possible. Some are separating, as the one 
described above, while some others are pooling. In the pooling equilibria, the ’wet’ 
type manages to masquerade as ’dry’, but the true preferences of the incumbent 
policymaker are revealed in the final period of the game.
Another example of the dramatic effects of changes in the information structure 
is provided by Canzoneri’s paper (1985) which leads to a re-appraisal of the normative 
conclusion of Rogoff (Rogoff 1985). Rogoff, adopting a framework germane to that 
of Canzoneri but with symmetric information, argues that in the presence of shocks 
that can be offset by government policy, a fixed rule yielding zero inflation is no 
longer optimal. In fact, the discretionary outcome would have the disadvantage of
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higher inflation but the advantage of output stabilization, so that a zero inflation rule 
cannot unambiguously be said to yield a higher payoff than the time-consistent 
solution. Rogoff therefore concludes that credibility and stabilization problems cannot 
be considered separately and there exists an optimal degree of commitment. In 
Canzoneri’s study, the asymmetric information comes from the fact that the monetary 
authorities have private information about their forecast of a shock affecting the 
money demand function. This simple change produces reversionary periods, i.e. 
periods in which the public punishes the government by setting high inflationary 
expectations, even if the policymakers have not cheated and have only attempted to 
offset shocks. This highlights the fact that the private sector’s inability to monitor the 
authorities’ actions closely can render the working of reputational forces more shaky, 
so that high inflation might still recur. With this quite realistic information structure, 
the model can account for variations in actual and expected inflation, besides allowing 
that reputation can be lost but subsequently regained. However, this model requires 
an infinite horizon in order to yield these results.
Cuckierman and Meltzer (1986) introduce uncertainty on behalf of the public 
about the government’s changing preferences. In this study, the policymakers’ 
manipulation of the private sector’s expectations comes out very clearly. The 
authorities decide to control money growth more noisily than the minimum possible 
given the available technology. This strategy leads to a reduction in the public’s 
monitoring and therefore the production of positive (negative) inflation surprises 
when these are more advantageous (disadvantageous). It is also worthwhile noticing 
that the optimal degree of ambiguity is chosen by the government.
In contrast to Cuckierman and Meltzer's analysis of the steady state, Cripps
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(1991) examines the convergence path towards the steady state in a model where the 
public does not know the government’s preferences. Cripps considers two types of 
learning, rational and non-rational. In the case of rational learning, the presence of 
asymmetric information leads to a reduction of the inflationary bias, but in the long 
run the solution converges to the complete information outcome. When non-rational 
learning takes place, even the long run solution is affected and the reduction in 
inflation is permanent. Cripps’ analysis is conducted using a discrete-time model.
The literature surveyed above advances the theory of optimal policy planning 
and goes a long way from the original static framework in modelling complex 
behaviour on behalf of policymakers and the public alike. The models are extended 
to include information asymmetry, a very realistic assumption which yields 
considerable modifications to the players’ strategies. Nevertheless, there is still need 
to understand more about the strategic interactions between policymakers and private 
agents in such a setup.
This chapter therefore attempts to elaborate a model in which the private sector 
learns about the government’s preferences. The public learns about a parameter o f the 
policymakers’ objective function; this is equivalent to assuming that the possible types 
of policymakers are infinite. The analysis is focused on the convergence towards the 
steady state. This work generalises Cripps (1991), providing an explicit calculation 
for the time path of government policy when it is attempting to acquire a reputation. 
The main difference with respect to Cripps’ work is the fact that the analysis is 
conducted in continuous time. The techniques used are considerably less cumbersome 
than discrete-time ones and could, therefore, be fruitfully employed to solve more 
complex models; an example of this is provided by the model developed in the next
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chapter.
In the model below, the monetary authorities and the public sector engage in 
a repeated game in which the government tries to acquire a reputation for being tough 
and the public tries to learn its type. Using a Kalman-Bucy filter, the private sector’s 
mechanism for updating expectations is derived, and the government’s optimal time- 
consistent policy is obtained using the Bellman principle of optimality. The 
policymakers’ actions provide information used by the public in the revision of their 
expectations. The authorities’ actions are hence the endogenous source of information 
in the model, and since they are aware of this, the optimal policy is also the optimal 
signalling strategy.
The rest of the present chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 the 
model is introduced, the details of the information structure illustrated and the solution 
procedure sketched. In Section 2.3, the Kalman-Bucy filter is employed to solve the 
private sector’s learning problem. The optimal policy of the government is worked 
out in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model
The model presented here shares with a standard policy game a ‘ la Barro-Gordon the 
objectives of the government which likes to create surprises in inflation, as these boost 
output, but dislikes inflation per se. The government’s objective function is specified 
below:
(1)
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where:
Egov = expectation operator with respect to the government’s information set; 
p = discount rate;
c + u = weight attached to unexpected inflation; 
n , = actual inflation rate at time t; 
n  ,p = planned inflation rate at time t;
n,’ = E (jt,) = expected inflation where the superscript e denotes the expectation taken 
with respect to the private sector’s information set, E.
The time horizon is assumed to be infinite.
At this point, it is worth pointing out that, under symmetric information, the 
solution to the problem described above is the following:
ji f ■ c ♦ u. (2)
The equation above shows an inflationary bias equal to that present in a one-shot 
game.
The model is then enriched by its stochastic feature, and by the dynamics that 
result from the introduction of the asymmetric information structure. Uncertainty 
arises from the government’s imperfect control of inflation, due to the fact that the 
policymakers’ actions affect the inflation rate only indirectly. For simplicity, the 
government’s choice variable is called planned inflation. The imperfect control feature 
is modelled by setting actual inflation equal to planned inflation plus a white noise
disturbance, i.e.
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It follows that the actual price level, p ,, evolves according to the following stochastic 
differential equation
dp, -  ¡* dt + dzt , W
where z is a standard Brownian motion process.
The asymmetric information comes from the fact that the public does not know 
the relative weight of the two terms present in the government’s objective function, 
namely it does not discern how much policymakers care about output, and hence how 
much they would like to create inflation surprises, compared to the objective of 
keeping inflation down. It is assumed that while the average propensity to create 
inflation surprises is known to the public, i.e. c is common knowledge, u is not known 
to the private sector. The parameter u is drawn by the policymakers from a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and variance ouJ, at the beginning of the game, once and for 
all. This is tantamount to assuming that the possible types of policymakers are 
infinite. Private agents cannot observe the outcome of the drawing: thus the public 
only knows the average propensity of the government to create inflation. 
Nevertheless, the public is aware of the characteristics of the distribution from which 
u has been drawn. The mean of the distribution is the public’s prior, whilst the 
variance of the distribution is a measure of the dispersion of the beliefs of the private 
sector about the policymakers' preferences. The private sector will have to learn the 
value of this preference parameter by observing the actions of the government over
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time. One further element of the information structure is constituted by the 
assumption of the policymakers’ private information concerning their choice variable. 
This means that the policy authorities do not reveal the planned inflation rate even ex 
post. The implication of this is that the public cannot monitor the government’s 
actions precisely and its source of information is actual inflation. Thus, the public’s 
expectation operator, E, refers to an information set which is a subset of the 
authorities’, whose expectation operator is Egov.
The solution procedure is now illustrated. From the observation of actual 
inflation, the private sector gathers information, using an optimal Kalman-Bucy filter 
procedure, about the unknown element of the policymakers’ preferences, and hence 
revises its strategy, namely the expected inflation rate, optimally. The government is 
aware of the private agents’ learning process and the set up of the model presented 
here allows the authorities to solve their optimization problem taking it into account. 
The two players engage in a non-cooperative dynamic game of asymmetric 
information, in which both act strategically. These interactions constitute the core of 
the analysis; the aim is to analyze how the public’s inflationary expectations and the 
government’s choice of planned inflation are affected by the asymmetric information 
structure and the stochastic environment.
The solution consists of the optimal strategy of the two players. On one hand, 
private operators have to form the best estimate of the unknown parameter, on which 
the inflationary bias depends, so as to minimize forecasting errors; this is their 
objective function. On the other hand, the policy authorities have to choose the 
optimal strategy for the inflation path, given their preferences and taking into account
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the informational content of their actions l. The public’s filtering problem and the 
government’s optimization can be solved in a sequence of stages because the 
separation principle applies; it applies given the linearity of the stochastic differential 
equation, equation (10) below, and the fact that the objective function is quadratic in 
the control, n f, and linear in the state variable, ut\  (see Davis 1977).
The solution procedure begins by postulating the government’s optimal policy. 
It is conjectured to be linear in (c + u), i.e. it is assumed to be
« (c+u) A, , (5)
where A, is a fixed undetermined coefficient which will be optimally chosen when the 
government’s optimal strategy has been solved for. A, is assumed to be common 
knowledge. The conjectured policy function is then used in the filtering procedure 
which yields the optimal estimate of the parameter u, i.e. u"„ given the information 
available to the private sector. The stochastic differential equation which describes 
the public’s updating of beliefs becomes part of the policymakers’ optimization. In 
fact u | becomes the state variable in this problem. The Bellman principle of 
optimality is employed in the government’s optimization. The outcome is a solution 
to the problem at stake, only if the resulting policy is of the form initially postulated, 
so that it is possible to solve for the undetermined coefficients of the conjectural 
policy function.
The resulting equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium and the 
equilibrium is perfect bayesian.
' The slralcgy space which comprises all admissible strategics is the same for both players 
and is the real line.
23  The public’s learning: the Kalman-Bucy filter
The public’s strategy is given by the expected inflation rate, which is:
-  (c+û,) A, . (6)
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Private agents select their choice variable such that it minimizes their objective 
function, which is:
J (7)
The above equation expresses the fact that the private sector aims at minimizing the 
mean square error of the forecast of the inflation rate; this, given the information 
structure assumed here, is equivalent to minimizing the mean square error of the 
forecast of the parameter u.
The public’s learning problem can be formalized as follows:
du -  0 , E(u„) -  0 E(uo) -  o \  , (8)
dp, • n ’ dt + dz, -  (c+u)A, dt ♦ dz, . W
Equation (8) represents the dynamics of the system, which being a parameter in this 
case, does not vary over time. Equation (9) describes the dynamics of the 
observations, that is the actual inflation rate. Since both equations are linear, the 
estimate of u, can be obtained from a Kalman-Bucy filter procedure (see Oksendal, 
1985). The filter, u"„ satisfies the stochastic differential equation below:
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(10)
where k , = |A,2ds + l/a2 is the inverse of the solution, S,, to the Riccati equation
shown below:
^  -  -A,^,2 S0 -  E (u.-Efu,)]2 -  o 2. . (U)
The solution to the Riccati equation, S„ provides the mean square error of the estimate 
of u, at time t. Equation (10) describes the evolution of the estimate of u, i.e. the 
public’s updating of expectations. It shows that the speed of the private sector 
learning depends on various factors. One is the discrepancy between actual and 
expected inflation; the greater the discrepancy, the higher the speed of expectations 
updating. This entails that the learning is faster at the beginning of the game and 
slows down as private operators become more accurate in their estimate. Another is 
the variance of the distribution of u, i.e. a 2,,; the larger the degree of the public’s 
uncertainty, the faster the learning. Finally, the policy coefficient. A, , impinges on 
the updating of expectations; this implies that the government can decide to slow the 
learning, by choosing A, smaller than 1, or speed up the learning, by choosing A,
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greater than 1, or leave it unaffected, if A, equals 1 2.
Ito’s Lemma is now applied to the stochastic differential equation for the filter 
in order to obtain the solution, i.e. the public’s estimate of u. First, equation (10) is 
rearranged in the following way:
K,dfl, + A,2a,dt -  A,dp, - cA,2dt . 0 2)
Ito’s lemma is then applied to a function of the form:
g, -  K, 0, 03)
so that
dg, -  d(0,K,) -  K,dfl, ♦ A,20,dt . (14)
Equating equation (12) and equation (14), the following equation is obtained:
d(Q,K,) -  A,dp, -  cA > (15)
and integrating both sides, it results in being:
l,K, m |A,dp. -  jcA.2ds + R (16)
where R is an arbitrary constant. Now recalling the expression for K,, and substituting
2 The sequence of A,s affects also K,; the larger A, is, the larger K,. However, if one 
considers only one A, at a lime, keeping the others fixed, the effect of K, is infinitesimal, 
whereas there is obviously a finite effect on A, and hence the latter prevails.
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into equation (16), u," is derived as:
0. -
cA.2ds + R
(17)
|A.2ds + l/o2
The arbitrary constant R can be determined evaluating the previous equation at time 
0. It follows that:
Since u"0=0, R=0. Thus the solution to the filtering problem is the following:
This is the best estimate based on the observations available to private 
operators. It is best in the sense that it is the estimate which minimizes the expected 
value of the integral of the square deviations of the estimate from the true value of the 
parameter, measurable with respect to the o-algebra generated by the observations up 
to the time when the estimate is computed. It is worthwhile noticing that at time zero 
the public’s estimate of the parameter is the prior, namely the mean of the distribution 
from which u has been drawn. As time tends to infinity, the estimate converges to 
the actual value of the parameter. This implies that private agents will leam the 
government’s preferences.
a,0R - (18)
(19)
J  A.'ds + 1/cj2
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However, the public’s learning is not fully worked out until the policy 
coefficient A, , is determined in the government’s optimization. The policymakers’ 
problem is solved in the next section.
2.4 The government’s optimization
The government maximizes its objective function already illustrated, subject to the 
constraint describing the evolution of the public’s estimate of the preference 
parameter, u. The policy authorities’ optimization problem can now be stated as 
follows,
where n,' = E(n,) = (c+u‘,)At. The control variable chosen by the government is n,p, 
and the state variable is u",. The state variable is introduced in this asymmetric 
information setup because the government takes into account the effect of its actions 
on the public’s learning process, when carrying out the maximization. Equation (21) 
results from the filter of the previous section.
The procedure for the solution of this stochastic optimal control problem 
involves the use of Bellman’s principle of optimality and the application of the 
method of undetermined coefficients. From this, the government’s optimal policy for 
planned inflation will result; this strategy will be measurable with respect to the 
policymakers’ information set which includes all the history of all the variables of the
(20)
(21)
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model except the increment of the Brownian motion, dz,. The main finding of this 
exercise is that the government’s optimal policy involves an inflationary bias lower 
than that prevailing under complete information. However, in the long run, the private 
sector learns the true preferences of the policymakers and hence the government’s 
policy converges to that of the symmetric information scenario.
Proposition
The equilibrium strategy of the government, (ji,p) ' , obtained from the game specified 
above is:
Proof
The first step of the solution involves an assumption about the functional form of the 
value function. It is postulated to be linear in the state variable, as shown below:
(22)
where
(23)
and A satisfies the following differential equation:
A,A, - 2(A,)2 -  pA,2A, ♦ p2A,2 (A,-l)2 -  0 . (24)
V, (Û,) -  e - '1 W, (Û,) (23)
where
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(26)
and p,* and p lt are undetermined coefficients. At this stage the Hamilton-Jacobi- 
Bellman (HJB) equation can be written down, it results in
A dot denotes the first derivative with respect to time. The first order condition is 
subsequently derived by differentiation of the Bellman equation with respect to the 
control variable. The control is:
The next stage of the solution procedure involves the determination of the 
undetermined coefficient of the value function, namely p,, and p„. This can be done 
by substituting the control, np„ with the right hand side of equation (28) in the HJB 
equation. In this way an identity is obtained; therefore, it is possible to equate the 
coefficients of the terms in u", and the terms depending only on time, on both sides 
of the Bellman equation. This yields two differential equations for the coefficients of 
the value function. p^ , and p„, which are:
"T * (c+u) + p (28)
l*o, ’  PI*« ♦ cA, c ♦ « ♦ P,,-^ c ♦ u ♦ n.
A,
" X
(29)
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I1., ♦ (c+u)A, . (30)
The solution to equation (30) is fully developed in Appendix A, while only the 
solution is reported here, as it is necessary for the derivation of the optimal policy. 
It is given by
where
l*i. (c+u)e‘’' K, (31)
A lim '(•A c-
i  K.
ds . (32)
A has been chosen as the arbitrary constant in the differential equation for
because it is the only constant which yields a finite value of p a J. The term p„ is 
always negative and its limiting value as time goes to infinity is
lim plt
I-*»
(c+u)A,
P
(33)
It is now possible to substitute the explicit solution for p„ in the equation for 
the control, namely equation (28), and hence obtain
’ Notice that A is finite since the integrand tends to 0 as time goes to infinity.
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(34)
The solution is complete only once the sequence of A,’s over time has been 
worked out. This requires the application of the method of undetermined coefficients, 
so to obtain A, ,
From the above equation, an important result can already be noted, that is, as 
time tends to infinity, A, tends to 1, and hence the control becomes simply the 
symmetric information solution. This means that in the long run, as the public learns 
the government preferences, the policymakers are forced to revert to the complete 
information scenario. It can be concluded that the information asymmetry does not 
affect the steady state.
Equation (35) is then rearranged and differentiated with respect to time twice, 
to obtain the following second order differential equation for A, :
(35)
A,A, -  2(A)2 - pA!A, ♦ p2A,2(A,-l)J -  0, (36)
where two dots denote the second derivative with respect to time. The proof in now 
completed. The only stationary equilibria occur at A,=0 and A,=l. The above second 
order differential equation is then reduced to a system of two first order equations.
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A -  Y (37)
Y -  _L[2Yj ♦ pA2Y -  p2A2(A -l)2] . (38)
A
The phase diagram reported in figure 4 represents the above system. On the 
horizontal axis, there is A,, while on the vertical axis there is the first derivative of A, 
Yr The horizontal axis is also the stationary locus for A. The other two lines in the 
picture represent the stationary loci for the variable Y, i.e. the second time derivative 
of A. A stationary equilibrium occurs when the stationary locus for A and for Y 
cross; this takes place at 0 and 1, as already pointed out above.
In order to study the behaviour of the system around the equilibria, it is 
linearized around the stationary point A,= l (which will turn out to be the only relevant 
one). The system is non-hyperbolic, as one of the eigenvalues is 0. Hence, in order 
to study the stability of the system, it is necessary to use the centre manifold theorem. 
It is possible to show (see Arrowsmith and Place, 1990, p.99) that the centre manifold 
goes through the stationary point A,= l, and, provided A,<1, the system will converge 
to this equilibrium along the centre manifold, in a monotonic fashion.
It is now necessary to determine the initial value for A,, namely A«,. This is 
done by evaluating equation (35) at time 0. It results that,
Letting A, » Y, . and dropping the time subscripts, the following system results
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A»
1
(1+ A) '
(39)
Hence, since the limit of A, is finite, A<, cannot be 0. On the other hand, it can only 
be 1 if o u2=0, i.e. if there is no uncertainty. It is thus possible to conclude that, in the 
presence of uncertainty, A„ must lie in the interval (0,1). This implies that the only 
relevant stationary point is A,= l, as anticipated, and it has already been said that the 
system will converge to it. Furthermore, the initial value of A, depends on the 
discount rate and on the variance of the distribution from which u is drawn. The 
larger p, the closer A„ is to 1. Whereas, the larger ou2, the closer A«, is to 0.
The solution therefore, says that given the public’s lack of information and 
learning process, the government can sustain lower time-consistent inflation rates than 
that prevailing in the symmetric information framework. The initial inflation rate 
depends on p and ou2, namely on the policy authorities’ discount rate and the 
dispersion of the distribution of p (which can be interpreted as the private sector’s 
degree of uncertainty), and then the initial inflation rate increases monotonically over 
time tending to the full information solution. Hence, the incomplete information 
assumption has important consequences in the transition phase towards the steady 
state. The long run, however, is not affected by the information structure.
As pointed out above, the value of A, impinges on the public’s learning 
process; having found that it is lower than 1 signifies that the government’s optimal 
strategy entails slowing down the revision of expectations. By producing lower 
inflation rates, the policymakers render the relative size of the noise, present in the 
observations, bigger, and thus the informational content of the actual inflation rate is
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reduced.
Finally, the results obtained mirror Cripps (1991), however the procedure 
employed here turns out to be considerably less cumbersome and the results much 
clearer. Hence, it appears that these techniques could be used in order to tackle other 
models of strategic interaction between two players, where both behave optimally and 
one learns from the other’s actions.
2.5 Concluding remarks
Continuous-time stochastic techniques, namely the Kalman-Bucy filter and the 
Bellman principle of optimality, are used to solve a monetary policy game model with 
asymmetric information, where learning takes place. In the presence of uncertainty 
on the part of public about the government propensity to create inflation surprises, the 
government chooses a time-consistent inflation which is lower than that prevailing 
under symmetric information. Furthermore, the public’s learning is slowed down by 
the government. However, in the long run, the solution obtained under asymmetric 
information converges to the outcome resulting under symmetric information. This 
entails that the policymakers cannot conceal their preferences for ever. It turns out 
that continuous-time techniques are considerably less cumbersome than discrete-time 
ones and provide clearer results. Hence, there seems to be scope for their application 
in solving a wide class of similar economic models.
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Appendix A
In this appendix, the solution to the differential equation (30) for p„ is worked out. 
For convenience, the equation is rewritten below, rearranged in the following way:
Pn
'
P (c+u)A, . (40)
Recalling the expression for K,, one can see that
dlogK, _ A,2
dt ’ x  '
(41)
Therefore, the above equation can be solved as a standard first order linear differential 
equation with time-varying coefficients. The solution is:
-  (c+u)e'" K,
'(.Ac-"
1 K
ds (42)
where a is on arbitrary constant which is
A (43)
This is the only arbitrary constant which ensures that the value of ^  is finite at any 
time. This limit is finite because the value of the integrand tends to 0, as time tends
to infinity.



3.1 Survey of the literature and introduction
A pegged exchange rate system, like the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS), is often portrayed as an anti-inflationary device. 
Taking the ERM as an example, nominal convergence, widely understood as 
convergence in cost and price performance towards the lowest inflation rate (Ungerer 
et al. 1986), has been one of the main priorities of the system since its inception. 
Many argue that the core of the EMS, i.e. the ERM, is intended to help in the pursuit 
of price stability and has in fact significantly contributed to the disinflation of 
participating countries in the eighties.
The theoretical literature concerned with the channels through which an 
exchange arrangement can affect price performance can be grouped in two 
categories'. The first is labelled the disinflation literature. Taking high inflation as 
given, it examines the effects of an exchange rate rule on the disinflation process and 
on the related output costs. The second involves a game theoretic apprtxtch which 
attempts to explain the causes of high inflation equilibria. The issue here is to see 
how the pegging of the exchange rate could modify the equilibrium or time-consistent 
inflation rate.
In the disinflation literature the attention is focused on the sacrifice ratio, i.e., 
the output costs of disinflation. In order to analyse this problem, Fischer used a 
rational expectations model with staggered contracts. Since in an open economy under 
the assumption that purchasing power parity (PPP) always holds, the effects of a
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' The empirical evidence, which will not be reviewed here, concerning the ERM's 
contribution to (he disinflation of the eighties is mixed (Christensen 1987; Dombusch 1989; 
Dc Grauwe 1989a and 1989b; Grcssani et al. I‘>88; Giava/./i and Giovannini 19 8 9 ; Krcmcrs 
1990; Ungcrcr et al. 1986; Weber 1991; et al.).
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disinflation policy are the same as in a closed economy, Fischer’s closed economy 
model is considered first (Fischer 1984). Assume that the system is initially in steady 
state with constant monetary growth and a constant inflation rate. If an unanticipated 
contractionary policy is implemented in order to reduce inflation, the outcome will he 
a reduction in output, even if the policy enjoys full credibility J. The reason is that 
prices decline by less than the money stock because wages are not immediately 
renegotiated and thus real money balances fall. If the private sector does not believe 
the policymakers’ programme and interprets the contraction in money growth as a 
reduction in the level of the money stock, then output will remain below its 
equilibrium level. If agents learn, and adjust their expectations consistently, then 
output will eventually return to its equilibrium level: however, the sacrifice ratio is 
greater than in the case of full credibility.
The issue at stake is how the sacrifice ratio would be affected by the 
introduction of an exchange rate rule like the ERM. Fischer utilizes a Dornhusch 
model with overshooting, so that a contractionary monetary policy leads to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (Fischer 1988). The latter is a consequence of 
the staggered labour contracts and will be more conspicuous the longer it takes for all 
contracts to be renegotiated. Although Fischer’s study does not consider an ERM-type 
of regime, it can be a suitable framework for this purpose since, for a high inflation 
country, fixing the nominal exchange rate would similarly bring about a real 
appreciation and therefore have the same consequences with regard to disinflation.
2 If the anti-inflationary policy was anticipated, so that between the announcement and 
the implementation all contracts arc renegotiated, then there would be no output loss. 
However, this entails putting up with the existing inflation rate for a longer time. If the policy 
is anticipated hut wages cannot be renegotiated before the implementation, the effects arc the 
same as in the case of an unanticipated programme.
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When the exchange rate appreciates, there is an immediate reduction in the CPI 
because the price of imported final goods decreases. By the same token, there is a fall 
in the imported input costs; this increases aggregate supply and thus brings down the 
price of domestic goods. Moreover, a fall in wages will occur since they respond to 
prices. All these effects reduce the sacrifice ratio, as they produce an immediate 
downward push on prices. However, there is the contractionary effect on output 
exerted by the real appreciation; this makes the sacrifice ratio greater compared to the 
benchmark case, i.e., free floating when the exchange rate is at its PPP value all the 
time. Therefore, in this model, the sacrifice ratio depends on the parameters which 
determine the sensitivity of output to the real exchange rate and to the real interest 
rate, on the sensitivity of prices to the real exchange rate, as well as on the 
responsiveness of wages to both output and prices. Thus, comparison of the sacrifice 
ratio when the real exchange rate is kept constant to a case with an ERM-type 
exchange rate arrangement does not yield clear-cut results; without knowing the 
parameters values, one cannot tell whether the ERM has modified the output inflation 
trade-off faced by the policymakers.
Although the comparison of an ERM-type regime to a PPP model is a standard 
one in the literature, the policy-oriented debate places greater emphasis on the 
alternative option of implementing a disinflation program with a contractionary 
monetary policy. Differential effects of disinflation when pursued, alternatively, via 
monetary restraint and via fixing the exchange rate can be appreciated using van der 
Ploeg’s two-country model (van der Ploeg 1986). Here, if one compares the sacrifice 
ratio under an ERM-lype regime to the sacrifice ratio in the case of a contractionary 
monetary policy carried out by one country, the crucial element becomes the degree
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of overshooting. On one hand, fixing the nominal exchange rate would entail a deeper 
output loss, because it has no direct effect on core inflation and the downward push 
on prices occurs only through real exchange rate appreciation. On the other hand, 
with monetary contraction, if the overshooting is very large, it could offset the 
beneficial direct effect of the reduction of core inflation. As regards inflation 
performance, it is possible that a contractionary monetary policy combined with a free 
floating regime might induce a stronger squeeze on prices than a ERM-type regime, 
as the real exchange rate could appreciate even more. The critics of the ERM point 
out that during the disinflation of the eighties, countries outside the ERM have been 
able to adopt more drastic strategies and hence obtain a more rapid decline of inflation 
(De Grauwe 1989a, 1989b). However, a large appreciation might become politically 
unacceptable and encounter other kinds of constraints.
One reason why the use of the exchange rate is recommended as nominal 
anchor in a disinflation programme is that the price of foreign currency is an easily 
monitored key-price that can perform a signalling role (Dornbusch 1986; Bruno 
1990). Similarly, an argument often advanced to support the thesis of the ERM as 
anti-inflationary is that membership provides a "credibility bonus" to high-inflation 
countries. The importance of credibility in assessing the costs of disinflation is 
already clear in Fischer’s analysis. The output loss of a disinflation policy is a 
decreasing function of the credibility attached to the policy.
Even more compelling is Blanchard’s argument that different expectations can 
give rise to different equilibria; hence success or failure of a policy might crucially 
depend on its credibility (Blanchard 1985). As credibility is so important, in a 
scenario where the public is uncertain about the policymakers’ preferences, there is
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scope for deviations from the strategy that would be optimal in the case of symmetric 
information. In particular, a "conservative" government might choose an exchange 
rate level more appreciated than optimal, in order to establish credibility; the exchange 
rate is particularly suitable for this purpose because it is easily observable without lags 
(Winkler 1991). Although the exchange rate constraint for the countries participating 
in the ERM poses a limit to the degree of appreciation, the fact that it is a multilateral 
agreement could be a compensating advantage. The use of monetary policy, rather 
than the fixing of the exchange rate, can be appropriate when the aim is the reduction 
of inflation, not just in one country, but in the whole area (van der Ploeg 1986).
The game theoretic approach explains why a high inflation equilibrium might 
materialize. This literature, concerning monetary policy games in a closed economy, 
has been reviewed in the previous chapter. The inflation rate turns out to depend on: 
(i) the policymakers’ preferences with respect to inflation and output —the stronger the 
dislike of inflation, the lower the equilibrium inflation rate, (ii) the output-inflation 
trade-off facing policymakers -the smaller the effect of unexpected inflation on 
output, the lower the inflation. When considering an open economy, the real exchange 
rate can also be included in the objective function, since policymakers may be 
concerned about export profitability. The question is how an ERM-type regime might 
affect the time-consistent inflation rate. In a complete information environment, if a 
lower time-consistent inflation rate prevails, the sacrifice ratio will be reduced. This 
could happen either via a change in the trade-off between inflation and output 
perceived by the policymakers, or via a change in the authorities' objective function. 
If the ERM is portrayed as a system in which the nominal exchange rate is fixed 
between realignments and takes the PPP value at the realignment date, then the
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ensuing real exchange rate appreciation between realignments makes inflation more 
costly compared to the case in which PPP always holds (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988) 
*. It follows that the time-consistent equilibrium inflation rate is lower than in the 
case in which the real exchange rate is constant. In such a model, an inflation-prone 
country would choose this system, although its preferences are unchanged, because an 
inflation reduction brings about a welfare improvement. To summarize, the increase 
in the costs of inflating brought about by the exchange rate arrangement constitutes 
the advantage of "tying one’s hands", i.e., of participating in the ERM agreement.
Melitz identifies another possible source of costs of inflating, that is the 
measures necessary to prevent large capital outflows in the presence of inflation 
differentials and the subsequent realignments (Melitz 1988). Typically these consist 
of the maintenance of high nominal interest rates and are an increasing function of 
inflation. The outcome is obviously a lower time-consistent equilibrium inflation rate.
The game theoretic approach is also extended to consider the equilibrium 
inflation rates in different ERM members, taking into account the strategic interactions 
between countries (Canzoneri and Henderson 1988; Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989; 
el al.). This framework captures the purported asymmetry of the system, where 
Germany is the centre country *. The asymmetry comes from the fact that the centre 
country, which is the one with low inflation, chooses its monetary policy first and the 
inflation-prone country passively sets the same level of the money stock, in order to
1 In an open economy model in which PPP always holds, that is where the real 
exchange rate is exogenous and the authorities do not try to affect it, the resulting equilibrium 
inflation rate is the same as in a closed economy model.
4 For cxposilional convenience, Italy is used to denote a high-inflation country while 
Germany is the low-inflation country.
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maintain the parity. The analysis carried out by Canzoneri and Henderson (1988) (see 
also Giavazzi 1988) uses a two-country model, where wages are set to minimize the 
deviations of employment from its natural rate. The policymakers’ objectives are low 
inflation and a desired level of employment, which is higher than the natural rate. 
The employment objective of the high-inflation country is, however, more ambitious 
(this is the source of the larger inflationary bias). It is worth emphasizing that the 
comparison carried out by the authors is between the equilibrium inflation rate 
prevailing in a free floating regime, in which the two countries engage in a 
competitive deflationary policy, and the fixed exchange rate system which represents 
the ERM. The outcome of the optimization, in the former case, is a Nash equilibrium 
with a deflationary bias which partly offsets the inflationary bias due to the interaction 
between the authorities and the private sector 5. The optimization for the ERM-type 
regime results in an equal inflation rate in the two countries, which equals the closed 
economy outcome in the centre country. It is now possible to compare the two 
outcomes, i.e the free floating Nash equilibrium to the fixed exchange rate Stackelberg 
equilibrium. Germany’s inflation rate is higher than in the benchmark case. On the 
other hand, the high-inflation country sees a reduction in its inflation rate, provided 
the discrepancy between the desired levels of employment, and hence between the 
inflationary biases, is relatively big compared to the incentives to affect the real 
exchange rate in the floating regime. The latter are in turn the greater the larger the 
share of imported goods and the smaller the effect of the real exchange rate on 
income. Furthermore, the implicit assumption which has to hold is that the centre
5 The limc-consistcnt inflation rate in a closed economy is therefore higher than in an 
open economy with free floating.
64
country will retain her anti-inflationary stance.
Besides modifying the output-inflation trade-off, another consequence of a 
fixed exchange rate regime could be a change in the policymakers’ preferences. One 
way in which an exchange rate arrangement could bring about a change in the 
authorities’ preferences is by introducing some form of cooperation. If this involves 
the maximization of an objective function which is a weighted average of the 
participating countries’ objective functions, then the resulting inflation rate is higher 
than the one prevailing under German leadership with its focus on low inflation. The 
same reasoning would apply if countries differed with respect to desired output or 
unemployment levels. This is a scenario that will be more relevant for European 
Monetary Union (EMU), when a federal institution will conduct monetary policy 
(Currie et al. 1990).
In the context of a two-country model Collins (1988) compares alternative 
ways of portraying the ERM. Here only cooperative regimes are analysed, as these 
entail a change in the authorities’ objective function. Notice that in order to isolate 
the effects of this factor, expectations are modelled as static. Moreover, the model 
does not allow for an inflationary bias associated with attempts to obtain an income 
level higher than the natural one. It follows that the benchmark case consists of the 
Nash equilibrium with only a deflationary bias, which prevails in the game between 
the two countries. The most important implication of cooperative behaviour is that 
the two countries no longer try to export inflation. When there is a cooperative fixed 
exchange rate regime, the government’s policy is more deflationary than in the case 
of German leadership, i.e. in a framework equivalent to that studied by Canzoneri and
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Henderson (1988) 4. (Note that some of the above results are extremely sensitive to 
model specification.)
A well-known criticism of the ERM as a disinflationary device is the Walters’ 
critique. According to Walters (1986), an exchange rate regime of the ERM type, 
with perfect capital mobility, entails the equalization of nominal interest rates. In the 
presence of inflation differentials, real interest rates would be lower (possibly 
negative) in high-inflation countries. The ERM would therefore have perverse effects 
on price performance in those countries.
In a study in reply to Walters, Miller and Sutherland (1990) describe the 
Walters’ critique as a "case of inconsistent expectations". The analysis is intended to 
show that Walters’ line of reasoning is flawed. With the help of a model with 
forward-looking wage-setters as well as financial markets, Miller and Sutherland 
conclude that the events described by Walters would occur only if the exchange rate 
system had the confidence of financial markets but not of wage-setters. In fact, if the 
peg is not fully credible, then a nominal interest rate differential will remain together 
with high inflation expectations. On the other hand, if the exchange rate arrangement 
enjoys full credibility, then inflation expectations will fall, leaving the real interest rate 
unchanged. The Walters’ critique is also rejected by Giavazzi and Spaventa (1990) 
who argue that financial liberalization and enhanced credibility can help reduce 
inflation and strengthen the system. Specifically, they consider a high-inflation 
country which removes capital controls. The initially higher nominal interest rates 
attract capital inflows that, on one hand, lead to the appreciation of the currency, but
4 The explanation being that Germany now takes into account the higher initial inflation 
rate prevailing in Italy.
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on the other, tend to eliminate the nominal interest rate differential, so that there is a 
lowering of real interest rates. Moreover, another effect of liberalization is that more 
agents have access to foreign capital markets where the cost of borrowing is lower. 
In this scenario, initially, inflation-prone countries do experience a lower real interest 
rate. However, Giavazzi and Spaventa claim that the subsequent initial burst in prices 
makes the loss in competitiveness even larger, and provided this effect is stronger 
relative to the effect of the real interest rate on aggregate demand, inflation will 
decrease more quickly.
The literature surveyed here cannot provide a clear-cut answer to the question 
of whether a pegged exchange rate system can either improve inflation performance 
or permit a disinflation at a lower cost. The results of the theoretical studies depend 
on the framework chosen to portray the fixed exchange rate arrangement, the model 
used, and the objective function.
The debate about the effectiveness of a pegged exchange rate as an anti- 
inflationary device is particularly lively because some countries participating in the 
ERM experienced a very slow decline in inflation. Some argue that the public’s slow 
adjustment of expectations, the learning process, could explain the lengthy disinflation 
observed in some European countries after joining the ERM. Driffill and Miller 
(1992) and Giovannini (1990) deal with learning following an exchange rate regime 
shift similar to that assumed here.
In Driffill and Miller’s paper, the public learns about the probability of the 
occurrence of a realignment. The private sector starts from a high prior, and then 
gathers information from the observation of realignments. The Bayesian learning 
process is then embodied in a model of overlapping contracts a' la Calvo (1983). The
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contracts reflect the likelihood of a realignment and directly affect actual inflation. 
Due to the initial high probability attached to the occurrence of a realignment, and to 
the gradual revision of expectations, actual inflation declines slowly, competitiveness 
worsens and output descends below full capacity.
Giovannini (1990) adopts a Barro-Gordon type model, where inflation is 
replaced by the exchange rate and the latter becomes the policymakers’ choice 
variable. Once again it is assumed that a change in the exchange rate arrangement 
takes place, from floating, in which the government manipulates the exchange rate, to 
a fixed rate. Expectations about the exchange rate are formed looking at past 
experience and result in being initially higher than the actual value, but they adjust 
gradually, provided the parity is not changed. As a result, an output loss is incurred. 
A criticism which can be made of both studies is that they neglect the interaction of 
the public’s expectations with the government’s strategy, i.e. policy is not endogenous.
Others point out that ERM membership performs a signalling role of the new 
anti-inflationary stance and that a credibility bonus would ensue for inflation-prone 
countries. Along similar lines, some highlight the possibility that governments 
implement policies which convey information about their preferences to private agents, 
namely they signal their priorities amongst the different objectives. Britton (1992) 
discusses the importance of connecting the private sector’s revision of beliefs with the 
policymakers' strategy in order to understand the consequences of a policy shift, like 
the one occurring when a country joins the ERM.
No analytical model applied to this context has been developed embodying 
both rational learning and endogenous policy. Britton suggests that a rigorous theory 
of forecasting and endogenous policy of realignments would be very useful, but at the
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same time, he points out that it is unlikely that this can he done, due to the technical 
difficulties involved. This chapter attempts to close this gap existing in the literature. 
The aim is to see whether the thesis that learning can produce a lengthy disinflation 
is defensible on theoretical grounds, in the context of the model developed below. In 
particular, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse how the change in the exchange 
rate regime and the asymmetric information structure affect the public’s inflationary 
expectations and the authorities’ decision to create inflation.
It is assumed that, in the initial exchange rate system, PPP always holds. The 
public cannot gather information about the policymakers’ preferences about 
competitiveness, due to the fact that the crawling of the nominal exchange rate offsets 
domestic inflation, keeping the real exchange rate constant. Thus, the policymakers’ 
decision to create inflation cannot affect this variable. However, once the new regime 
is in place, the government’s choice to inflate entails worsened competitiveness and 
thus reflects its intentions with respect to the real exchange rate. The public can now 
learn about the authorities’ willingness to endure misalignments in the competitive 
position of their country. At the same time, since the government is aware of the 
private sector’s learning, it will take into account the information content of its actions 
in deciding the optimal policy. The approach and the techniques adopted here are the 
same as the ones used in Chapter 2.
The basic model is an open economy version of the Barro-Gordon model 
(Barro and Gordon 1983a) as used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), into which 
stochastic realignments are introduced. This appears to be the natural framework in 
which to imbed the asymmetric information feature and to analyse the interactions 
between the authorities and the public. The model consists of a dynamic non-
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cooperative game of asymmetric information between two players, the government and 
the private sector. This setup can also be used to examine what would happen when 
shifting to a monetary union.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the basic model, which 
includes stochastic realignments, is specified and the solution for the symmetric 
information case is derived. Section 3.3 introduces the asymmetric information 
structure and illustrates the solution procedure. In Section 3.4, the public’s learning 
problem is described. In the Section 3.5, the government’s optimal policy is worked 
out. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2. The basic model
The basic model is an amended version of the Giavazzi and Pagano model with full 
capital mobility (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988). The novelty is the introduction of 
stochastic realignments and the government’s imperfect control of inflation via the 
fiscal lever. The time-consistent inflation rate which results in the ERM type regime 
is lower than that prevailing under floating with PPP.
The model includes two goods: one is traded and its price, p \  is that prevailing 
on international markets and is an exogenous variable. The price of the tradable good 
in domestic currency depends also on the exchange rate at time t, s, , defined as the 
price of foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency. The other good is not 
traded and its price, p, , is set as a mark-up over wages, w, ; for simplicity p, equals 
w, . Wages are homogenous in the two sectors of the economy, the tradable and the 
non-tradable, and wage setting is based on the price level expected by private agents 
for time t, i.e. p't , on the level of the demand, y, , and on a supply shock, z, , 
modelled as a Weiner process, which cannot be immediately offset by the government. 
Aggregate demand depends on real government spending, g, - p, . Competitiveness, 
or the real exchange rate, q, , is an increasing function of p* and s, and a decreasing 
function of p, . Variations in competitiveness lead to changes in the composition of 
output. The profitability of the tradable sector, in turn, is directly related to
competitiveness.
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As it will be seen later, competitiveness will enter the government’s objective 
function7. All this can formalized in logarithms as follows:
p, -  w, (1)
Pi* + Py, + Z, (2)
-  g, -  p. (3)
p * + s, -  p, (4)
The core of the model is the non-cooperative game between two players, the 
government and the private sector. The duration of the game is infinite; it is a 
dynamic game. In this section, symmetric information is assumed and the only
7 This treatment of competitiveness is the same as that of Giavazzi and Pagano. It would 
also be possible to make aggregate demand dependent on competitiveness, i.c. introduce a q, 
term in equation (3). This would then modify equation (6) and (7) respectively as follows:
P, -  7------ !----- r[Pg, + P,'+z,+PO(p*+s,)l
[U P (U 6 )]1
dp, -  -------!------y (pdgt+dp,*+d/,).
Although nothing would change in the rest of the model, in this version of the model, output 
would decline between realignments, if inflation is positive. It would then go back to full 
employment when a realignment occurs, as this restores competitiveness. It follows that the 
level of economic activity would have a saw-tooth path. On the other hand, in the version 
adopted in the main body of the chapter, output is, on average, at its full employment level.
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uncertainty is represented by the supply shock. Later, the effects of the public’s 
ignorance are examined. Both players choose their actions by optimizing their 
objective function over an infinite horizon. The private sector’s objective is to 
minimize the mean square error of the inflation forecast8. The public moves first by 
fixing its strategy, which is the expectation of the price level, pe, , or equivalently the 
expectation of inflation, if, . Then, the government fixes its strategy, which is 
nominal public spending, g, . Before specifying the objective function of the 
government, it is useful to reduce the part of the model spelled out so far to two 
equations. Substituting equation (1) into equation (2) and rearranging, I obtain the 
first reduced form equation, i.e.:
which shows that output is a function of price, or inflationary, surprises, and it 
increases with both of these. Furthermore, output depends negatively on the supply 
shock. Equation (5) can now be equated to the right hand side of the aggregate 
demand equation, equation (3). This yields the second equation of the reduced form, 
that is:
The above equation shows that the price level is affected by the actions of both
* The public's objective function is specified in the next section in the sub-section on 
learning.
(5)
(6)
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players, namely by the public’s price expectations and the government’s choice of 
public spending. Notice also that the supply shock, z , , affects the price level, so that, 
given the public’s strategy, the authorities’ choice of g, does not determine a unique 
value for p ,, but there is a whole distribution of values. Equation (6) can be rewritten 
in terms of rates of change and it results in being:
In the rest of the paper instead of referring to g  as the strategy of the government, for 
simplicity, the choice of planned inflation, np1 , is the authorities’ strategy The 
distinction between planned inflation, which is determined by the government, and 
actual inflation is necessary because of the government’s imperfect command of 
inflation, carried out by fiscal policy. Actual and planned inflation differ by a white 
noise disturbance, i.e. the increment of a Weiner process, so that the evolution of the 
price level is described by the following equation:
In Giavazzi and Pagano’s paper, inflation is controlled by monetary growth. 
However, assuming perfect capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate l0, the choice 
of inflation can no longer be made via monetary policy, which becomes endogenous
* The strategy space, which comprises all admissible strategics, is the same for the two 
players and is the real line.
10 This proposition is true even if the exchange rate system is not exactly fixed, hut 
allows infrequent adjustments of the parity, like the EKM. although the degree of the 
endogeneity of monetary policy would he reduced.
(7)
dpt -  ji '  ill ♦ dz, . (8)
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(see also Obstfeld 1988; Winckler 1991). For this reason, I make inflation a function 
of the fiscal lever and this calls for imperfect controllability of inflation.
The government’s objective function can now be put forward. The authorities 
like to create inflation surprises, as these raise output. They also dislike inflation per 
se and its damaging effects on the profits of the export sector, which depend on the 
level of competitiveness. The government maximizes the following objective function:
where p is the authorities’ discount rate, and Egov is the expectation operator with 
respect to the government’s information set (which, in this basic model, coincides with 
the public’s information set). The control variable is jtp, and the state variable of this 
problem is q, , i.e. the real exchange rate.
The real exchange rate can also be expressed in the following way:
where q„ is the level of competitiveness at time 0, i.e. when cumulated inflation is 0, 
which equals p" plus s0 , and is assumed to be the level of the real exchange rate 
prevailing in the floating regime, that is the PPP level. As time goes by, 
competitiveness is eroded by previous inflation.
(10)
Realignments are the other crucial variable, besides domestic inflation, in 
determining the real exchange rate. In equation (10), t, denotes the date of the last
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realignment, so that the integral represents cumulated inflation from that date. This 
is so because it is assumed that at each realignment date the initial level of 
competitiveness, q0 , is restored. The modelling of realignments put forward here 
differs from Giavazzi and Pagano's. In their paper, realignments occur at given 
dates, with a fixed time interval between them, even when full capital mobility is 
allowed for However, it is not clear how to reconcile perfect capital mobility 
with fully anticipated realignments. Here, this problem is overcome by introducing 
stochastic realignments. A Poisson process has been chosen to model realignments 
because it captures the fact that realignments occur infrequently. The random 
variable X, denoting the number of realignments, is distributed as a Poisson process. 
The probability of having a parity change is constant over time and, in an interval of 
time which tends to 0, equals '*
prob(X-l) -  XAt ♦ o(At) <n >
where X is the parameter of the Poisson process, which is an institutional feature of 
the monetary system, and hence, outside the authorities' discretion.
The fact that at each realignment the level of competitiveness q0 is re­
established, combined with stochastic parity changes and imperfect controllability of 
inflation, entails that the size of the realignment is also a random variable.
Initially, each period between realignments is treated independently from any *1
11 In Giavazzi and Pagano’s paper, when full capital mobility is introduced, the government's 
objective function is modified to capture the dislike for interest rate variability induced by parity 
changes.
11 The probability of more than one event occurring in an interval of time which tends to zero, 
is zero.
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other period. This is intended to model a situation in which, after each realignment, 
everything goes back to the beginning. Later in this section, it will be shown that, in 
the deterministic case, the solution obtained when each period between realignments 
is treated independetly holds also when links between realingments are taken into 
account.
When everything goes back to the beginning after each realignment, the 
problem becomes separable between parity changes. Therefore, only one of these 
intervals of time is considered, as the problem is the same in each of them. The 
government's objective function is modified accordingly, that is neglecting 
temporarily the distinction between x, and x*. by assuming that x, is a deterministic 
process, it results in being;
where the date of the last realignment has been normalized to 0 and r„ denotes the 
date of the next realignment. The latter is a stopping time defined by:
in words, it is the first time the random variable X takes the value 1. Before 
proceeding with the optimization, it is necessary to calculate the expectation of the 
whole objective function, which is a function of the random time. The result is 
presented in the lemma below.
r. inf |t >0; X.-11 . (13)
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Lemma 1
Given that the density of the random time r„ is:
(14)
and letting
Q, - hq, ♦ , (15)
the expectation of the objective function with respect to the next realignment date is:
Proof
The expectation of the objective function with respect to the random time can be 
computed as follows:
Equation (16) is obtained by reversing the order of integration in the right hand side 
of equation (17).
The problem has thus been transformed from a stochastic one, due to the 
presence of a stopping time as the horizon of the optimization, into a deterministic 
one, where the parameter of the Poisson process, X, appears as additional discounting
(16)
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in the government’s objective function “ .
The government’s optimization can now be tackled. Formally, the problem 
is the following:
Max je'*’** Jhq, ♦ c(x,-x;) -  ix? ] *
(18)
s.t. 4 * . (19)
where equation (19) is obtained by differentiating equation (10) with respect to time. 
As already mentioned, t, is the control variable and q, is the state variable. The 
solution which satisfies the equilibrium condition t, = namely the time-consistent 
solution for the inflation rate, denoted by x'„ can be easily obtained as:
- c h(X+p)
(20 )
The optimal inflation rate is time-invariant and shows that a country has always lower 
inflation when participating in an exchange rate arrangement like the ERM than under 
a free floating regime with PPP. In fact, under the latter regime the real exchange 
rate cannot be affected by policymakers' actions, so that the time-consistent inflation 
rate coincides with the closed economy solution, which is x”, = c. In the solution 
obtained here, under the pegged exchange rate regime, the reduction in the 
inflationary bias is larger, the smaller are the discount rate and the probability of
“ If the simplifying assumptions of having x, = and x, deterministic were removed, the 
problem would still be stochastic. In the rest of this paragraph these assumptions are maintained 
because the solution for the optimal policy is the same, whilst the distinction between actual and 
planned inflation and the stochastic nature of w, will be reintroduced in the next paragraph.
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having a realignment This makes sense because if realignments are more likely, 
and hence the expected date of the next realignment is closer, the period during which 
inflation costs are incurred is shorter. Hence, the tighter the institutional constraint 
is, the greater is the benefit of lower inflation resulting from "tying one’s hands". 
Also, the larger h is, i.e. the more the government cares about competitiveness, the 
lower inflation is.
In order to prove that the same solution results in the case in which the links 
between realignment period are taken into account, it is necessary to consider the 
government’s objective function composed of the infinite sequence of periods between 
parity changes, i.e.:
where r, denotes the time of the ith realignment, r, is a stopping time defined by:
The above equation means that r, is the first time that the variable X (which is the 
number of realignments) takes the value i. The calculation of the expectation of the 
government’s objective function, which is a function of the random times of parity 
changes, is presented in the lemma below, maintaining the assumption that t, is 
deterministic.
“ Notice that in this model it is not necessarily the case that there is a positive inflationary bias; 
in fact it is possible to have 0 as a time consistent inflation rate, or even a negative rate.
(21)
r. ■r( - inf (t > 0; Xt-i] ; -  0 . (22)
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Given that the density of the random time r, is:
X (rX)-' e-'-
Lemma 2
(23)
the expectation of the government’s objective function with respect to the 
realignments dates is:
| e Q ,  dt ♦ |e--(l-e-**) Q. ds; s>r,. (24)
Where
Q. - hq. ♦ c(x.-*;) - I tJ; s>r,. (25)
Proof
Firstly, equation (21) is rewritten as15:
E Q, dt ♦ E (26)
The expectation of the first element in equation (26) has already been computed in 
lemma 1. Hence, the expectation of the first element appearing in the summation in 
equation (26) is calculated in the following way:
" Notice that in what follows s always denotes a time after the first realignment.
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where the right hand side term involves the product of the element whose expectation 
has to be calculated times the density of the time of the first realignment. By 
reversing the order of integration, this computation results in:
E (28)
The expectation shown in equation (28) is then computed as follows:
E j^ e ~  (1-e"**) Q. dsj - 
( X (rf f  * ' j j e - -  0 -»■*•) Q. dsj dr, .
(29)
In order to solve the double integral in equation (29), the order of integration is 
reversed and the integral in r 2 is computed using the general formula shown below.
f x (T-xr e * - g  ( w oo)J, (¡-1)! T‘ U
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The expectation of subsequent elements of the summation in equation (21) can be 
worked out in the same fashion. V„ can thus be written as:
V, ■ | Q t ds ♦ f e "  ( l -e ' ^Xe'^+Xse' *)  Q, ds ♦
* 0  -*0
e' ”  (1 - e ■*•)( 1 -e  ‘‘-Xse“ )(e"‘‘♦ X s e “ ) Q, ds ♦ ...
(32)
Equation (32) is simplified by noting that if a new variable, f,(s) , defined as:
f(s) -  1 -  e'** -  Xse"“ (33)
is introduced, the right hand side of equation (32) can be expressed in the following 
form:
•  ■**** Q. ds ♦ j e - "  Q,
Once the appropriate cancellations are made, equation (24) results and the proof is 
completed.
In this deterministic world, since competitiveness is restored to its initial level 
q„ after each realignment, Q. cannot be affected by government’s decisions taken 
before the first realignment. Thus, the optimization of the objective function 
appearing in equation (24) is equivalent to the optimization of the objective function 
presented in equation 16. It follows that the government's optimal policy is the same
[f,(l -f,)*f„f,(l - f . K f . f . d d s  . (34)
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in each period between realignments.
The separability between realignments does not hold any longer when the 
problem is stochastic and asymmetric inform ation is present. In this latter case, due 
to the continuing learning process o f the public, the government policy affects the 
initial conditions o f the game in subsequent periods. In particular, it affects the 
public’s estimate o f  the parameter h and the precision o f  this estimate. In the 
following section, w here asymmetric inform ation and learning enter the analysis, it 
is assumed that after each realignment everything goes back to the beginning, due for 
exam ple to the fact that the incumbent governm ent resigns and a new one com es to 
power. Hence, each period between realingm ents is treated independently from  any 
other period. This assumption is adopted because it simplifies the solution procedure 
without affecting the results in any substantial way.
Finally, this model can also be used to derive the optimal time-consistent 
inflation rate in a monetary union, x i n  which realignments are ruled out and hence 
lambda equals zero. The solution for the time consistent inflation rate is:
From  the above equation, it is possible to see that inflation would be low er in a 
monetary union than in the ERM-type regime exam ined above. This is explained by 
the fact that in the form er case inflation entails a  permanent loss in com petitiveness 
and thus greater costs are incurred than in a pegged exchange rate regim e. Notice 
that in a monetary union, since the loss o f com petitiveness cannot be recovered, in 
order to prevent the accumulation o f current account deficits, it will be necessary to
embody additional features in the model which constrain the inflation rate from 
diverging from that of o ther member countries o f the union. An example o f  this 
might be to make the param eter, h, an increasing function o f  the level o f the real 
exchange rate.
3.3 The model with asymmetric information: the information structure and the 
solution procedure
In this section, the information asym m etry between the government and the private 
sector is introduced, as already sketched out in the introduction.
In a country which has recently changed the exchange rate regime, from 
floating to a peg, it may be the case that the public does not know how much the 
government cares about com petitiveness “ . It seems reasonable to introduce the 
private sector’s uncertainty in the param eter h o f the authorities’ objective function, 
because the public never had the opportunity to gather information about this 
preference param eter in the flexible exchange rate regime with PPP. It is assumed 
that the distribution from which h has been drawn is common knowledge and it is:
h — N( H , oj ) , (36)
where the mean o f  the distribution is the public’s prior and o*k is the variance o f  the 
distribution, which is an indicator o f the public’s degree o f uncertainty.
In this section, the assumption o f  imperfect controllability o f  inflation by the
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“ As already pointed out in the introduction, in the floating regime assumed here, PPP holds at 
all times, so that the government cannot affect the real exchange rate. In the pegged exchange rate 
system instead, the government's decision to create inflation reduces competitiveness.
85
h -  N( E , al ) , <36>
w here the mean o f the distribution is the public’s prior and a2,, is the variance o f the 
distribution, which is an indicator of the public’s degree o f uncertainty.
In this section, the assumption o f im perfect controllability o f  inflation by the 
governm ent is made; thus the evolution o f  the price level, or actual inflation, is as 
shown in equation (8). Furtherm ore, planned inflation, which is the authorities’ 
strategy, is the governm ent’s private inform ation, whereas actual inflation is observed 
by all agents in the economy. It is clear that in this set up the information sets o f  the 
two players differ: the public’s information set is a subset o f the governm ent’s one 
and com pared to the latter it lacks h and t **,.
From the observation of actual inflation, the private sector gathers 
inform ation, using an optim al Kalman-Bucy filter procedure, about h, the unknown 
elem ent o f the policym akers’ preferences, and hence optimally revises its strategy, 
namely the expected inflation rate.
The analysis is aimed at examining how the public’s inflationary expectations 
and the government’s choice o f optimal planned inflation are modified by the 
asymmetric information structure and the stochastic environm ent, given that both 
players act strategically.
The public’s filtering problem and the government’s optimization can be 
solved in a sequence o f  stages because the separation principle applies; it applies 
given the linearity o f the stochastic differential equations, which represent the 
constraints, and the fact that the objective function is quadratic in the control and 
linear in the state variables (see Davis 1977). The solution procedure is the same as 
the one used in the previous chapter. It begins by postulating the governm ent's
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optimal policy. The following form is postulated:
(37)
where A, and B, are undetermined coefficients which will be derived once the 
governm ent’s optimal strategy has been solved for. A, and B, are assum ed to be 
common knowledge.
The stochastic differential equation which describes the public’s updating o f  beliefs,
h*t becomes the second state variable, in  addition to q, , in this asymmetric 
information context. The resulting equilibrium  is a rational expectations equilibrium 
and the equilibrium o f this game is a perfect bayesian equilibrium.
3.4 The public’s learning
The public uses a Bayesian algorithm, i.e . the Kalman-Bucy filter, to obtain and 
revise the estimate o f the parameter h and then sets its strategy as:
which is the evolution o f h ,, becomes part o f  the policym akers’ optim ization. In fact
(38)
The chosen strategy is measurable with respect to the information field generated by 
all the variables o f the model which can be observed by private agents. It minimizes 
the public’s objective function, which is:
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J = E J ( i t -» f)2 dt . (39)
o
In other words, the private sector aim s at minimizing the mean square error o f the 
forecast o f  inflation, which, given the information structure assumed here, is 
equivalent to minimizing the mean square error o f the forecast o f the param eter h.
Form ally, the filtering can be expressed by two equations. The first, equation (40), 
describes the system, which is the param eter h. The second equation (41) describes 
the evolution o f the observations, namely actual inflation or the variations o f  the price 
level. The equations are as follows:
Since the above equations are linear, the estimate can be computed with the Kalman- 
Bucy procedure. The estimate of h, h , , is the best estimate based on the available 
observations. In fact, the filter at time t is adapted to the a-algebra generated by the 
continuous observations o f actual inflation from time 0  to time t and minimizes the 
mean square error o f the forecast o f  h. The filter, h*, , satisfies the following 
stochastic differential equation:
dh -  0 ; Eq (h) -  ÏÏ , Eo [h-Eo (h )f -  a\ . (40)
dt + dz. . (41)
(42)
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w here S, =  E[(h - h J 2] solves the determ inistic Riccati equation shown below:
N otice that the speed at which the public’s learning takes place depends on two 
things, besides the param eters o f the model, i) the term in brackets in equation (42), 
which is the discrepancy between actual and expected inflation, and hence, between 
the true and the estimated value o f  h. This element becomes sm aller and smaller as 
tim e goes by , because the public is learning. The learning process is thus faster at 
the beginning when each observation conveys a lot o f inform ation, and slows down 
over time, ii) Bt , that is the undetermined coefficient to  be chosen by the 
governm ent. The sm aller Bt is, the slower the adjustment o f expectations, because 
the greater becom es the relative size o f  the noise in the observations 14. Likewise, 
the larger B, is, the stronger the signal the government sends, and hence, the easier 
fo r the public to extract inform ation. Finally, solving the stochastic differential 
equation o f  the filter, the following expression for the estimate o f  h is obtained: 16
16 The B,s affect also S, in an inverse way; the larger the B,s are, the smaller S, is; 
however, if one considers only one Bt at a time, keeping the others fixed, the effect on S, is 
infinitesimal, whereas there is obviously a finite effect on B, and therefore the latter effect 
dominates.
(W )-
(43)
T he solution to equation (43) is:
-i
(44)
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(45)
It is possible to see that at tim e 0, the public’s estimate o f h is ju st the prior; as time
Notice that the public sector’s strategy, t*,, is not fully worked out yet, since 
it includes both A, and Bt which are unknown so far, and will only be determined in 
the governm ent’s optim ization. This is done in the next section.
3.5. The government’s optimization
The governm ent’s optim ization problem in the asymmetric information environment 
can now be tackled, as all the elements needed are available. These are: i) the 
governm ent's objective function; ii) the evolution o f  the first state variable, 
competitiveness; iii) the evolution o f the second state variable, the public 's estimate 
o f the parameter h. The second state variable is newly introduced in the asymmetric 
inform ation case, because the authorities now have to take into account the effects of 
their decisions on the public’s learning process. The strategic interactions between 
the tw o players can thus be examined.
Formally, the governm ent’s optimization is:
tends to infinity, i.e. in the steady state, h t tends to the true value.
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s.t. dq, = -  x f dt -  dz, , (47)
(48)
where x®, is given by equation (38) and K, is defined in equation (44). The solution 
procedure involves the use o f  the HJB equation. It provides the optimal government 
policy, that is the optimal path for planned inflation, given the private sector’s 
strategy. Since the governm ent’s decision plan satisfies the HJB, it is time-consistent. 
The strategy is measurable with respect to the policym akers’ information field, 
generated by the history o f  all the variables o f the model, excluding the current value 
o f the supply shock. The resulting equilibrium is a perfect bayesian equilibrium. 
Proposition
The equilibrium strategy o f  the government, (x4^ )*, obtained from  the game outlined 
above is:
Proof
The solution is derived by postulating the following form for the value function:
(X*p)
h (49)
where C -  1 (50)
V, (q, , fi.) -  W, (q„ fi,) , (51)
where W t is a linear function o f  the state variables, qt and h , , that is:
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w t " Mot ♦ Mn Q, ♦ Ma fi, • (52)
The HJB equation is then a partial differential equation in V and results in being:
max cuf -  c
(X*p)w , -  Aa -  Au qt -  A21
fi.B,
-  Ma
cAt -
B,
(X+p) ^(»f)2 ♦ H  -  Mi,»f
(X+p)K,
wf - L ,  - 6'B' 1(X+p)J
(53)
from which the first order condition yields:
(xf)* - c - M2tBt
(X+p)K,
(54)
The next step consists o f the determination o f the undetermined coefficients o f the 
value function, p lt and p 21 . by equating the term s in q, and in h , respectively, on 
the left hand side and the right hand side o f the HJB equation. This gives two 
deterministic differential equations, one in p It and the other in p 2t- The solutions 
to these equations, which are fully worked out in Appendix B, are respectively:
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(55)
e(WX R e -  i
______ L c - i —_____(X*p)  ^ K.
(56)
where
C ■ lim
i-» «•
' B.e (57)
o
The coefficients n u and p 2t are then substituted in the optimal control, equation (54). 
The governm ent’s strategy results in being of the form initially postulated in equation 
(37), so that it is the rational expectations equilibrium solution, which will be 
com plete after the determination o f the coefficients A, and Bt, which appear in the 
conjectural function. The solutions for A, and B, are shown below.
The two equations above, substituted in equation (40) to give equation (57), complete
B, -  1 ; (58)
(59)
J .  -<W)*
< 1 .
the proof.
A, and B, can now be substituted also in the equations o f  the learning process.
For convenience, I rewrite the equilibrium strategies o f the two players: 
i) the governm ent’s strategy:
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(* ? )* “ c e
(X*0)t
(X-p )2 e - l V - * ( \ * p )
(60)
ii) the private sector’s strategy:
( O ’ 1 -
e (X«P)«
(X+p)2
t -<X*p)«
e -  i v -  * (X *p )  ’
(61)
where
s,
V  ♦ I * .  * 4(X-p)2 'o ajj (62)
K, t
(X*p)2
and
C l im
t-* O*
t e -(X‘o)*
ds .
(63)
(64)
Some observations on the optimal governm ent’s policy are now warranted. 
F irst o f all, the coefficient, At, is less than one; this means that planned 
inflation is lower in the presence o f asymmetric information than in the case of
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symmetric information. The informational advantage offers the possibility to the 
government to sustain lower time-consistent inflation rates.
The second observation concerns Bt which is unity; this shows that the second 
term in the planned inflation formula (equation 60) is unchanged with respect to the 
symmetric information scenario (see equation 20). This second element of the 
government’s choice of inflation appears with the introduction of the pegged exchange 
rate regime and can be labelled the "discipline effect" of the ERM type system. The 
finding that Bt equals one signifies that the discipline effect is not affected by the 
asymmetry in information. Furthermore, there is another important consequence of 
the fact that Bt is constant over time. This is the fact that policymakers do not 
manipulate the public's learning process, neither in the form of signalling their 
preferences (and hence speeding up the process of learning which would have 
required a decreasing sequence for the B,s), nor in the form of slowing down the 
revision of inflationary expectations (which would have required an increasing 
sequence for the B,s). It is worth pointing out that the government is subject to two 
types of pressures. On one hand, it would like to conceal its preferences in order to 
slow down the learning. On the other hand, it is eager to behave according to its 
preferences. In this case, the two forces are perfectly balanced. In other words, the 
government chooses not to manoeuvre the speed at which private agents glean 
information. The latter does only depend on the discrepancy between actual inflation 
and its estimated value, and is therefore greater in the early stages of the game and 
decrease as the degree of uncertainty of the public is reduced.
The solution to the game when the public's uncertainty tends to zero, 
converges to the solution of the symmetric information case presented in Section 3.2.
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This can be shown by computing the limiting value for the control equation (54) as 
time tends to infinity. In fact, since /x2t >s finite and Kt tends to infinity, as time 
tends to infinity, as shown in the Appendix B, the third term on the right hand side 
tends to 0 and equation (54) reduces to equation (20).
The path of the time-consistent inflation rate for a country which switches 
from a flexible exchange rate regime, where the law of one price always holds, to a 
pegged exchange rate system, like the ERM, in the presence of asymmetric 
information, shows an initial decline which exceeds the long run reduction due to the 
change in the exchange rate regime. It is possible to label this an "overshooting” of 
the inflation rate owing to the informational asymmetry, or a "honeymoon effect". 
Immediately after the regime shift, i.e. at time 0, the value of Aq is:
A0 “ 1 C
(A*p)2 ’
(65)
and hence inflation equals:
(66)
The above formula shows that the initial value of A, is further away from 1 the 
greater is p2,, , because the greater is a2,, , the larger c  • T h 's means that the
more the public is uncertain about h, the lower the time-consistent inflation rate, so 
that the overshooting effect is larger. The value of \  also depends on p and A the 
more the government discounts the future payoffs and the more likely a realignment,
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the closer Aq is to 1, i.e. the smaller the additional bonus in terms of reduced 
inflation. Given the initial value of t**,, inflation then increases towards the long run 
level prevailing under the new exchange rate regime, which is lower than the one 
resulting under the free float system assumed here.
The public’s expectations of inflation immediately after the regime switch
equal:
It easy to see that the discrepancy between actual and expected inflation, at time 0, 
depends on the gap between the true value of h and the private agents’ prior. The 
unconditional mean of the distribution from which h has been drawn is not explained 
in this model, instead it is taken as given. Therefore, it is only possible to say that 
if the prior is higher than the true value of h, for example because it is based on the 
past history of high inflation, then the public will over-estimate inflation. Similarly, 
if the prior is lower than the actual h, maybe because the private sector judges the 
regime shift as the beginning of a new game, inflation will result in being under­
estimated. In expected terms, the public will continue, also after the initial moment 
after the regime shift, to overpredict the inflation rate, in the first case, and to 
underpredict in the second case. Although prediction errors disappear when the 
private sector has learnt the true h, during the learning phase, prediction errors have 
implications for output. Negative inflationary surprises entail an output loss, whereas 
positive inflationary surprises boost income. Notice, however, that the path of 
planned inflation is independent of the prior. In this regard, it is worthwhile pointing
(67)
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out that, if the pegged exchange regime is adopted as an anti-inflationary strategy, 
whilst in a symmetric information scenario the reduction in the time-consistent 
inflation rate occurs with no output loss, in an incomplete information setup it is 
possible that, although the government’s policy involves lower inflation, expected 
inflation remains high. If this occurs, the sacrifice ratio is greater than in the 
symmetric information framework.
The model presented above can also be used to examine a shift from a free 
floating regime to a monetary union, setting X equal to zero.
3.6. Concluding remarks
This chapter analyses the consequences of a shift in the exchange rate regime, from 
a free float with PPP to a pegged exchange rate regime with realignments, like the 
ERM (or to a monetary union), on the actual and expected inflation rate. The main 
feature of the model is the presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information 
concerning the government’s preferences about competitiveness. In this framework, 
the public’s learning and the government’s optimal policy are worked out.
The main findings of this chapter are: i) immediately after the regime shift, 
there is a "honeymoon effect” where inflation drops to a level that is lower than the 
one which prevails once private agents have learnt the true value of the preference 
parameter. There is an "overshooting" of planned inflation, due to the authorities’ 
information advantage which allows them to sustain lower time-consistent inflation 
rates 17. In the presence of asymmetric information, the advantage of tying one’s
17 The reduction in planned inflation entails also a reduction in actual inflation in 
expected terms (where the expectation is done with respect to the government’s information 
set).
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hands is temporarily increased, ii) The reduction of actual inflation could be 
accompanied by output losses for certain values of the public's prior concerning the 
unknown preference parameter, iii) The policymakers’ optimal strategy does not 
involve either signalling or concealing of the government’s preferences. The speed 
of learning is not affected by the authorities’ policy, iv) As time passes and private 
agents leant, inflation converges to the symmetric information equilibrium which is 
characterized by lower inflation compared to that of the initial free float regime. 
Hence, policymakers cannot conceal their preferences indefinitely.
These results, which take fully into account the strategic interactions between 
the government and the private sector, challenge the view that informational 
asymmetries and the public’s learning could be responsible for the slow decline in 
inflation, observed in some countries, like France and Italy, subsequent to joining the 
ERM; previous findings were based only on the expected inflation path. The public's 
inflationary expectations, however, have an important role to play also in the model 
developed here, since they determine, together with actual inflation, the level of 
output. In fact, whilst the government’s strategy does not depend on the private 
sector’s prior for the unknown preference parameter, the path of expected inflation 
does depend on it. The conclusion reached in this chapter is consistent with the 
experience of the UK after joining the ERM, when inflation declined rapidly, but then 
rose again; during the decline in inflation high output costs were incurred.
Appendix B
The solution to the differentia] equation for m,., 
The differential equation for /xlt is:
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(X+p)m h  -  An = h • (68)
The solution to this linear deterministic differential equation is straightforward:
‘  T P S  ’ [ ' “  ‘  TJsSss]
(69)
and the only value for p 10 which ensures that p ]t is always finite makes p lt time- 
invariant, i.e.:
Mu
h
( \+ p ) '
(70)
The solution to the differential equation for u -». 
The differential equation for p2t ' s as follows:
hx (X*p) ♦
B,2
( X * P ) 2 K ,
M21 -
CB,
(\*p)
(71)
Recalling that
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—!— f B,2ds ♦ -L 
0 ^ * p ) 2  o o h
(72)
it is possible to see that:
B2 d logK,
(X *p )2 K t dt
(73)
It follows that the solution to equation (71) is:
e<w* Ktc 
(X *p )
-(X «o).
■LB- ^ -ds
(74)
where c is an arbitrary constant. The choice of c *s niade to ensure that p2t
is finite at all times. There is a unique constant which satisfies this requirement and 
this is the following:
\ .  -<W>*C -  lim  B , l — ----- ds .
1-* om 1 K
(75)
It is possible to show, using De L’Hopital rule, that the limiting value for p2t as time 
tends to infinity is:
lim pj,
i— »
cB.
(X *p )2 '
(76)
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, an exercise is presented which uses the model developed in Chapter 
3, Section 3.2. The exercise consists of changing the source of uncertainty facing the 
private sector. Here, the uncertainty is placed in the government’s preference 
parameter c. Thus, it is assumed that the public does not know the weight attached 
to inflationary surprises by the government.
The issue examined here is of some interest in the study of policymakers’ 
optimal strategies in the presence of asymmetric information. The rationale for this 
analysis is to see whether changing the source of uncertainty affects the authorities’ 
optimal policy and, in particular, whether this modifies the government’s behaviour 
towards learning manipulation. The comparison of the solution to be derived in this 
chapter to that obtained in Chapter 3 will highlight the differences, if any, brought 
about by different information asymmetries embedded in the same model. The 
solution procedure employed here mirrors that of the previous chapter.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the information 
structure. In Section 4.3, the learning process is worked out. In Section 4.4, the 
optimal government policy is derived; the ensuing discussion compares and contrasts 
the authorities' strategy to that of Chapter 3. Some concluding remarks follow in
Section 4.3.
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4.2 The information structure of the model
The information structure assumed here differs from that of Chapter 3 in one aspect 
only: the asymmetry in information between the government and the private sector 
concerns the preference parameter c instead of h. This means that the public does not 
know the policymakers’ propensity to create inflationary surprises.
The distribution from which c has been drawn by the government, at the 
beginning of the game is common knowledge, and it is:
where c is the private agents’ prior, or the unconditional mean of the distribution; 
a2c is the variance of the distribution and measures the public’s degree of uncertainty.
The conjectural function for the government’s policy remains unchanged and 
is reported below for convenience:
available observations of actual inflation. The public's optimal strategy, which 
minimizes the mean square error of the inflation forecast, is:
c -  N (c ,af) , 0 )
(2)
4.3 The public’s learning
The private sector works out the best estimate of the parameter c, c ,, based on the
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** = ClA' (X *p )B‘ (3)
The filtering problem can now be stated in its standard form:
-  c, Eo [c -F 0 (c)]2 -  a] . W
cA, -  h p Ht *  d7 (5)[  '  (A+p) 'J * •
where the first equation describes the system, c, and the second describes the 
evolution of the observations.
The stochastic differential equation for the Kalman-Bucy filter results in being:
hB.dp, - e,A* (X *p )| dt
(6)
where K, is the inverse of the solution to the Riccati equation and equals:
(7)
The public’s estimate of the parameter c starts from the prior c . at time 0, and is 
revised according to equation (6) thereafter. As time tends to infinity, it can be 
shown that c*, converges to the true value of c.
Notice that here the speed at which private agents revise their beliefs about the
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unknown parameter, c, depends on two factors, i) The discrepancy between the true 
and expected value of c. ii) A ,, which is one of the undetermined coefficients to be 
worked out in the government’s optimization. If A, results in being unity, this means 
that the policymakers do not affect the speed at which the public updates its estimate. 
If, instead, A, results in being different from one, this implies that the government 
manipulates the learning speed. If the A,s form a decreasing sequence, the authorities 
signal their preferences and facilitate the solving of the public’s signal extraction 
problem. Likewise, if the A(s form an increasing sequence, the government tries to 
conceal information, hence it slows down the learning process.
4.4 The government’s optimization
The government’s objective function is the same as in the previous chapter, as is the 
equation describing the evolution of the first state variable, competitiveness. On the 
other hand, the equation showing the time path of the second state variable, which 
now is c , , is given by equation (6).
The government's optimization is expressed by the following equations:
max E (8)
dq, -  -* f dt -  dz, ,
( 10)
w here t*, is given by equation (3) and K, is defined in equation (7). w4’, is the
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government’s control variable as before.
Proposition
The equilibrium strategy of the government, i*41,)*, obtained from the game specified 
above is:
i A e"(X*p)*
Orf)* ■ c 1 ♦ A,e<W)'
i  ■«. H
h
( K * p )
where
C - lim f _ i _ ----- ds .t-o. J0 K,
( 11)
(12)
and A, satisfies the following differential equation
A,A, -  2(Al)2 -  (X*p)A2A, ♦  ( X ^ A . V . - l ) 2 -  0 . (13)
Proof
The following value function is conjectured:
V, (q, ,Ct) ■ W, , ('*)
where
w i "  Mo, ♦ Mi, q. ♦ M2, • (,5)
The HJB equation results in being:
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( \ * p )
(16)
From equation (16), the first order condition yields the following formula for the 
control
Equating the terms in q, on the left hand side and right hand side of the HJB 
equation, a differential equation in n u is obtained; the solution to this is:
Once the terms in ct are equated in the HJB equation, the resulting deterministic 
differential equation is:
The solution to equation (19) is shown below:
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A e -(*♦/>)•
ds -  C (20)
K,
where
C - ds (21)
H2t is always negative and finite. Equation (18) and (20) can now be substituted in 
the optimal control equation (17). The solution derived is of the form initially 
postulated, so that the rational expectations equilibrium of the game is obtained. This 
equilibrium is perfect bayesian.
The coefficients A, and B, are:
Since equation (23) is not an explicit formula for A,, it is necessary to rearrange it 
and then differentiate it with respect to time twice in order to obtain a differential 
equation which describes the time path of A,. It turns out to be the same as the one 
obtained for B, in Chapter 2, that is:
B, -  1 (21)
A. -  1 ♦ A.e(X*** < (22)
A,A, -  2(Al)2 -  (X*p)A,2A, ♦ ( X ^ A ^ A , - ! ) 2 -  0 . (23)
This completes the proof. The solution to this second order differential equation has
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already been worked out in Chapter 2. Hence, only its characteristics are recalled 
here, in order to compare this solution to that of Chapter 3. The value of A, at time 
0 is:
A0 -  - L  . (25)
UC
therefore Ag lies in the open interval (0,1). The lower a2c and the greater are p and 
X, the closer Aq is to 1. Unity is the only relevant stationary value for A„ and A, 
converges to it as time tends to infinity. The sequence of A,s starts from A^, given 
by equation (25), and then increases towards 1, namely towards the full information 
solution. The meaning of this solution is that, owing to the information asymmetry, 
the government chooses a lower time-consistent inflation rate compared to the full 
information scenario. This is also a feature of the solution obtained in Chapter 3, 
when the uncertainty was placed in h. However, the crucial difference between the 
solution obtained here and that of the previous chapter is that here the authorities’ 
optimal policy does involve learning manipulation, whereas this was not the case 
earlier on. In particular, the government reduces the speed at which learning takes 
place by choosing the A,s initially small and then increasingly larger as the public 
learns. The same result would apply if the uncertainty concerned the weight attached 
by the government to inflation, namely about a, assuming that the inverse of a was 
normally distributed.
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4 .5  C onclud ing  rem ark s
This exercise highlights that, not only information asymmetries and learning change 
the solution dramatically compared to the full information case, but also that 
information asymmetries concerning different parameters, although embedded in the 
same model, bring about different solutions.
The major difference in the government’s optimal policy with respect to 
Chapter 3 is that when the uncertainty concerns h, i.e. the weight the government 
attaches to competitiveness, the authorities do not affect the speed at which the 
public’s learning takes place. On the other hand, when the uncertainty regards c, that 
is the government's propensity to create inflation surprises, as it has been the case in 
this chapter, the government does embark on learning manipulation which slows down 
the public’s revision of expectations.
In conclusion, the source of uncertainty does matter, as it affects the 
government’s optimal strategy and determines whether learning manipulation is 
carried out by the policymakers.
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The thesis expands our understanding of the interactions between the government and 
the public. Part I idenfies the time-consistency issues that arise in a managed 
exchange rate regime, while Parts II and III shed some light on the strategic 
behaviour of the policymakers and the private sector in an environment with 
uncertainty and incomplete information.
Part I of this thesis deals with optimal exchange rate management and focuses 
on the time-consistency issues that arise when a country pursues exchange rate 
stabilization but wants to retain some monetary independence. The analysis 
conducted in Chapter 1 points out that discrepancies between the time-consistent 
policy and the optimal (time-inconsistent) linear rule can emerge both in the long run 
equilibrium and in the path to the steady state. In particular, if there is no conflict 
between the exchange rate and the money target, then the incentive-compatible policy 
differs from the optimal one only in the speed of convergence to the long run 
equilibrium. The optimal linear rule turns out to be faster than the discretionary 
outcome, as it would pay the government to commit itself to a rule which brings the 
exchange rate closer to the target. The situation in which there is a conflict of 
objectives is more interesting and yields differing results even in the long run. If the 
government pursues a strong exchange rate but loose money target, then the long run 
money stock is higher in the time-consistent case than with the optimal linear rule. 
The reverse is true if the government’s objectives are tight money and a depreciated 
exchange rate. Under the time-consistent policy there is a long run bias which can 
be avoided by precommitment to a linear rule. The speed of convergence also differs 
as between the time-consistent policy and the optimal linear rule, but which of the 
two is faster depends on the type of conflict and on the initial condition. The findings
I l l
of this chapter offer a rationale for the setting up of institutions which can provide the 
commitment technology in order to make the time-inconsistent policy a sustainable 
outcome.
Parts II and III shed some light on the consequences of the presence of 
uncertainty and asymmetric information on optimal policy planning.
Chapter 2 analyses a closed economy model a" la Barro-Gordon and the 
attention is focused on the government's time-consistent policy. The presence of 
asymmetric information initially permits lower time-consistent inflation rates than in 
the symmetric information case. But the time path of inflation is increasing and 
converges to the complete information equilibrium. Furthermore, the government’s 
policy affects the speed at which the private sector learns with the result that the 
public's revision of expectations is slowed down (although, in the long run, private 
agents do learn the true preferences of the government). Thus, the information 
structure is a crucial element in this model; it enhances the scope for strategic 
interactions between the players, affecting the government’s policy and the private 
sector's expectations in a substantial way. This model can help explain the 
'honeymoon period’ which policymakers experience immediately after taking office - 
-here this consists of low time-consistent inflation. It also explains how the 
government may try to take advantage of this situation by hindering the public’s 
learning process, before the true nature of the government eventually becomes known 
to the private sector.
The open economy model developed in Part III, Chapter 3, examines the 
consequences of asymmetric information when a shift in the exchange rate regime 
takes place. In this chapter, the public is uncertain about how much the government
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cares about international competitiveness, which turns out to simplify the results. 
Specifically, the optimal government strategy does not involve either signalling or 
concealing its preferences. These findings challenge the view that informational 
asymmetries could account for the slow decline in inflation observed in some 
countries after joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary 
System. In particular, the analysis implies that, immediately after the regime change, 
inflation is lower than in the steady state itself. This decline in inflation may not be 
costless, however, as it can be accompanied by high output losses if inflationary 
expectations start from a high level (depending on the values of the public’s prior on 
the government’s preferences). These results which take fully into account the 
strategic interactions between the government and the private sector, are consistent 
with the experience of the UK after joining the ERM, when inflation fell sharply but 
rose subsequently.
Finally, Chapter 4 shows how the way in which the information asymmetry 
is introduced matters for the determination of government policy. When uncertainty 
concerns, not the level of competitiveness but the propensity to create inflationary 
surprises, it turns out that, as in Chapter 2, while at variance with Chapter 3, the 
government now optimally chooses to delay the public’s learning. In short, the 
results previously obtained for a close economy may well arise in the open economy.

The conflict case
s > m
Figure 2
The conflict case
s < m
Figure 3
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